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Organizational Law as
Conunitment Device
Morgan Ricks*
What is the essential role of the law of enterprise organization? The
dominant view among business law scholars today is that organizationallawthe law of partnerships,corporations,private trusts, and their variants-serves
primarily to structure relations between business owners, on the one hand, and
business creditors, on the other. Under this "asset partitioning" theory,
organizational law's main purpose is to shield business assets from claims of
creditors of the business's owners, thereby giving business creditors a
structurally senior claim on business assets. By relieving business creditors of
the need to inspect the creditworthiness of business owners, the theory goes,
organizationallaw allows creditors to economize on information. This Article
challenges the primacy of the asset-partitioningtheory. It identifies another role
of organizationallaw that may be every bit as essential as asset partitioning.
That role is property relinquishment: organizational law provides a
mechanism for business co-owners to relinquish their legally cognizable
property interests in specific business assets. The Article demonstrates that this
property-relinquishment feature was present even in the traditional AngloAmerican common law of partnership, despite outward appearances to the
contrary. Unlike the asset-partitioningtheory, which centers on relations with
third parties, the property-relinquishment theory centers on relations among
business co-owners. It is primarily concerned with commitment problems rather
than information problems. The Article draws connections between the
property-relinquishmenttheory of organizationallaw and three other areas of
scholarly inquiry: the "anticommons" literature in property, the conceptual
foundations of bankruptcy law, and the economic theory of the firm.
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INTRODUCTION
Does the law of enterprise organization (the law of partnerships,
corporations, private trusts, and their variants) confer an ability to "do"
anything that can't be accomplished through contract alone? Until a
decade and a half ago, business law scholars had no coherent answer to
this question. It would probably be more accurate to say the question
was seldom posed in this way. Theorists tended to describe
organizational forms in vague, metaphorical terms. It was (and is) often
said, for example, that a corporation can be understood as a "juridical
person" or a "nexus of contracts." While these analogies can be useful in
some contexts, they are imprecise, and they lack functional content.
Since 2000, though, the field has had an answer-or so it would
seem. That year saw the publication of Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman's justly celebrated article, The Essential Role of
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Organizational Law.1 Hansmann and Kraakman argued that
organizational law does let people do something they cannot
realistically do through contract alone. I will describe their thesis in
some detail below, but its essence is this: organizational law lets people
create a particular pattern of creditors' rights. When a business resides
within an organizational form, business assets are shielded from claims
of creditors of the firm's owners. (Note that this is essentially the inverse
of the more familiar principle of limited liability, which holds that
assets of firm owners are shielded from business creditors.) Hansmann
and Kraakman refer to this feature as "asset partitioning" 2 or "entity
shielding," 3 and they argue that it could not realistically be done
through contracting.
What's so valuable about asset partitioning (entity shielding)?
Hansmann and Kraakman find a number of advantages, 4 but one
advantage predominates: with asset partitioning, business creditors
need not concern themselves with the owners' creditworthiness. They
can focus exclusively on the business itself, without worrying about the
personal financial circumstances of the owners. This makes credit
analysis much easier and reduces firms' borrowing costs. Thus
organizational law exists primarily to solve an information problemto create "efficient incentives for gathering and using information."5 I
think it is fair to say that Hansmann and Kraakman's theory has
achieved unrivaled supremacy among business law scholars.
Hansmann and Kraakman's argument is not merely that asset
partitioning is an important feature of organizational law. Their claim
is far stronger: that asset partitioning is "the sine qua non of the legal

1.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000). Aspects of their argument were foreshadowed in Henry Hansmann & Ugo
Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 434 (1998).
2.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390. More precisely, they refer to this feature
as affirmative asset partitioning, as distinguished from defensive asset partitioning, which denotes
the shielding of personal assets from claims of firm creditors (e.g., limited liability). See id. at 39394. Because this Article does not deal with defensive asset partitioning, my use of "asset
partitioning" throughout is shorthand for affirmative asset partitioning.
3.
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2006).
4.
See infra note 26.
5.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 1, at 404. For an early gesture in the direction of the
asset-partitioning theory, see Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditorsof Affiliated Corporations,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 517 (1976) ("Acquiring the necessary information will become even more
complicated if we allow not only the subsidiary's creditors to reach the assets of the parent, but
the parent's creditors to reach the assets of the subsidiary . . . .").
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entity,"6 "[t]he essential role of all forms of organizational law,"7 and
"the core defining characteristic of a legal entity."8 Indeed, they contend
that
the partitioning off of a separate set of assets in which creditors of the firm itself have a
prior security interest . .. is the only essential contribution that organizational law makes
to commercial activity, in the sense that it is the only basic attribute of a firm that could
9
not feasibly be established by contractual means alone.

While Hansmann and Kraakman do not deny that other aspects of
organizational law are important, they believe "the economies involved
are not of the same order as those involved in asset partitioning."1 0
Asset partitioning, they submit, "is the only important feature of
modern firms for which substitutes could not be crafted, at any price
that is even remotely conceivable, using just the basic tools of contract,
property, and agency law.""
This Article offers the first significant challenge to these strong
claims. To be clear, I do not object to the claim that asset partitioning
is an important role for organizational law. I just question whether it is
the essential role-or even the main one. I will show that organizational
law does something else that may be just as important. It solves a
commitment problem-one that contract law (alongside property law
and agency law) can't realistically address. More specifically,
organizational law provides a mechanism for business co-owners to
relinquish their legally cognizable property interests in specific
business assets. Such relinquishment practically eliminates the ability
of co-owners (and their successors/heirs) to defect with individual
business assets, thereby allowing for the creation of durable asset
configurations and, hence, going-concern value. Note that this propertyrelinquishment function of organizational law has nothing to do with
creditor priority, information problems, or anything like that. Instead,
it is about relations among co-owners.
In the case of corporations, this property-relinquishment feature
of organizational law may seem almost self-evident. No corporate
shareholder imagines herself to have any direct property interest inany right to possess or exclude others from-any specific business asset.
Nor would any business lawyer dispute that modern U.S. partnership
law has this feature. All fifty states base their partnership statutes on
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 3, at 1338.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id.
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either the Uniform Partnership Act ("U.P.A."),1 2 promulgated in 1914,
or the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("R.U.P.A."), 13 promulgated in
1997. The U.P.A. provides that business assets are held in a special
property estate, the "tenancy in partnership," under which individual
ownership rights are effectively extinguished. 14 The R.U.P.A. is even
more explicit, providing that partnerships are "entities" with direct
ownership of business assets.15 Individual partners have no direct title.
The older common law of partnership, however, presents a much
more difficult case. For there was no entity to speak of and nothing
called "tenancy in partnership." Formal legal title to business assets
was lodged in one or more of the individual partners. This apparent
exception poses a significant challenge to the property-relinquishment
theory of organizational law advanced herein. Any truly essential
function of organizational law should be in the law's DNA, so to speak.
Features with a more pervasive presence across organizational forms,
past and present, have a better claim to being essential attributes.
(Perhaps for this reason, the theoretical scholarship in this area
exhibits a deep preoccupation with legal history; this Article is no
exception.) The general partnership was the workhorse organizational
form for business activity prior to the ascent of the corporation in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If it lacked property
relinquishment, my argument would lose much of its force.
It turns out, though, that traditional partnership law did cause
individual partners to relinquish their legally cognizable property
interests in specific business assets. As I show below, it did so through
a set of interlocking equitable doctrines that, in combination, trumped
formal legal title-depriving individual partners (and their
successors/heirs) of the usual incidents of ownership. As a consequence
of these doctrines, no individual partner could unilaterally remove any
specific asset from the configuration; the governance structure of the
partnership held effective veto power over asset diversion. 16 In this way,

12. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (amended 2013), 6 U.L.A. 1 (2015).
13. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2015).
14. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 25, 6 U.L.A. 194-95 (2015).
15. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a), 6 U.L.A. 56 (2015) ("A partnership is an entity distinct
from its partners.").
16. The thrust of this argument was partially anticipated by Larry Ribstein. In describing
the "modern" partnership-a term that, in his usage, encompasses the nineteenth-century AngloAmerican partnership-he wrote:
[P]artnership property rules preserve owners' and creditors' joint rights in the firm's
assets from interference by individual owners and their creditors. This enables the
owners to commit common property to a collective business strategy without concern
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traditional partnership law allowed venturers to commit to more
durable asset configurations than would have been possible (or would
today be possible) through contracting alone, thereby supporting the
creation of going-concern value.17
The oft-cited "dissolvability" of the traditional partnership
might initially seem to cast doubt on this conclusion. It is well known
that the traditional partnership at will could be dissolved at the option
of any partner and was automatically dissolved upon a partner's
bankruptcy or death.18 Implicit in much of the literature in this area is
the supposition that the traditional partnership was a delicate creature,
with business assets prone to sudden, disorderly scattering upon
dissolution.19 But "dissolution" referred then (as it does today) to a
change in legal relations among partners; it did not necessarily imply a
piecemeal dismantling of the business. To the contrary, as we will see,
traditional partnership doctrine sought to preserve existing
configurations of business assets upon dissolution, thereby supporting
business continuity and going-concern value. Crucially, these
continuity-enhancing features of traditional partnership law depended
upon the inability of partners (or their successors/heirs) to assert
property interests in specific business assets upon dissolution. In other
words, the legal technology of property relinquishment promoted goingconcern value.
Some may hear echoes here of another prominent theory in
organizational law: Margaret Blair's theory of "locking in capital." 20
Blair argues convincingly that the corporate form became popular
that an individual owner might divert the firm's property to some personal use or other
business.
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 41 (2010) (emphasis added). By contrast,
Hansmann and Kraakman have emphasized that their theory has little to do with owner
commitment (which they view as essentially contractual) and much more to do with creditor
monitoring. See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 3, at 1341-42. This Article expands
on Ribstein's insight by showing why property relinquishment should not be viewed as purely
contractual.
17. The separation of legal and beneficial ownership is of course practically the defining
characteristic of the law of trusts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 1, intro. note (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) (describing "[t]he distinction between legal interests and equitable interests" as
"fundamental" to trust law). It is useful to conceive of the traditional partnership as a species of
self-settled trust-with one or more partners serving as both settlor(s) and trustee(s), the corpus
of partners serving as beneficiary, and each individual partner serving as agent of the trustee(s).
As we will see in Part III, contemporaneous commentators on traditional partnership law often
used the language of trusteeship.
18.

See, e.g., 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 28-33 (Da Capo Press 1971)

(1828).
19. See infra note 140.
20. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLAL. REV. 387 (2003).
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among business organizers in the nineteenth century largely because
the corporate form, as compared to the (readily dissolvable)
partnership, offered a superior means to lock in financial capital. In
essence, my claim is that the traditional partnership did in fact offer
capital lock-in-albeit lock-in of a comparatively weak form when
judged against the corporation. In this sense, Blair's lock-in theory is
more powerful than she envisioned: it explains not only how the
corporation improved on partnership, but also how, in the context of
joint enterprise, organizational law-includingpartnership-improved
on contract. It is this latter question that Hansmann and Kraakman
sought primarily to answer.
The property-relinquishment theory of organizational law
described herein, which focuses on inter se partner relations and
commitment problems, should not be understood as displacing the
Hansmann-Kraakman asset-partitioning theory, which focuses on
creditor relations and information problems. The two theories are not
mutually exclusive; they can be seen as complementary. My central
points are: (1) that property relinquishment, like asset partitioning, is
a pervasive attribute of organizational law; (2) that it could not be
realistically replicated through contracting alone; and (3) that there is
no obvious reason why it should be seen as any less "essential" than
asset partitioning. More generally, perhaps the search for one essential
role of organizational law is misguided; the right answer might be
plural rather than singular.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the HansmannKraakman asset-partitioning theory and subjects it to critical scrutiny
along two dimensions. First, I show that the possibility of contractual
upstream guarantees-which are very common in certain contexts,
such as corporate groups-significantly diminishes the informational
benefits that organizational law can provide to business creditors. Such
guarantees override asset partitioning. Creditors must therefore
monitor for the absence of such guarantees-a task that presents the
very "moral hazard" difficulties that asset partitioning is supposed to
bypass. Second, I examine the asset-partitioning theory through the
lens of the law of security interests. Hansmann and Kraakman see a
close kinship between organizational law and security interests: both of
these legal technologies reduce information costs by giving certain
creditors prior claims on particular assets. I show, however, that
organizational law does not afford the primary informational benefit
that the law of security interests offers; namely, the ability of a
prospective creditor to avoid relying on (potentially unreliable)
information and assurances from the debtor itself. Consequently, the
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informational advantages afforded by organizational law may be
somewhat less substantial than has previously been supposed.
Part II describes the property-relinquishment theory of
organizational law, using a stylized example to convey the essence of
the argument. I show that, when a business is jointly owned, it is
infeasible to create a reliably durable configuration of assets (a
prerequisite to going-concern value) using only the tools of property,
contract, and agency law. The problem is one of defection; the co-owners
cannot make a sufficiently strong commitment to one another, nor can
they make a commitment that is binding on their successors and heirs.
Organizational law thus plays an essential role in structuring relations
among co-owners. The analysis relies in part on Guido Calabresi's and
Douglas Melamed's famous distinction between "property rules" and
"liability rules." 21 As we will see, the law of contracts is by design a
liability-rule system, whereas organizational law protects asset
configurations with (far stronger) property rules.
What of the objection that traditional partnership law did not
offer property relinquishment? Part III responds to this challenge by
investigating the nineteenth-century Anglo-American common law of
partnership. Through an analysis of the five leading partnership
treatises of the era, I show that, contrary to what some scholars have
supposed, traditional partnership law did divest individual partners of
cognizable ownership interests in specific partnership assets-though
it did so in disguise. Property relinquishment was accomplished
through three equitable features of partnership doctrine, which I call
the disgorgementfeature, the in rem feature, and the title-consolidation
feature. These features created a degree of commitment that would have
been infeasible through contractual means.
Part IV draws connections between the property-relinquishment
theory of organizational law and three other areas of scholarly inquiry:
the "anticommons" literature in property, the conceptual foundations of
bankruptcy, and the economic theory of the firm. I show that each of
these domains is centrally concerned with the problems that arise from
fragmentary property interests. The property-relinquishment theory
thus opens the way for greater theoretical integration between these
seemingly disparate fields. Concluding thoughts follow in Part V.

21 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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I. ASSET PARTITIONING AND THE PRIORITY OF CLAIMS

It is not hard to see why Hansmann and Kraakman's theory has
been so influential. The theory possesses simplicity, elegance, and
depth. This Part describes their theory in some detail and subjects it to
critical scrutiny. I argue that the informational-efficiency benefits of
asset partitioning may be somewhat more modest than advertised. This
conclusion sets the stage for the next Part, which lays out a different
though complementary theory: the property-relinquishment theory.
A. The Hansmann-KraakmanThesis
Hansmann and Kraakman begin their analysis of organizational
law with a deceptively basic set of questions:
Do [organizational forms]-as the current literature increasingly implies-play
essentially the same role performed by privately supplied standard-form contracts, just
providing off-the-rack terms that simplify negotiation and drafting of routine agreements?
Or do the various legal entities provided by organizational law permit the creation of
relationships that could not practicably be formed by contract alone? In short, what, if
22
any, essential role does organizational law play in modern society?

Their answer is that organizational forms are not merely standard-form
contracts, because organizational law offers something that cannot
readily be accomplished through contracting alone. That something is
asset partitioning: the shielding of the entity's assets from the claims of
creditors of the entity's owners. Owing to organizational law, business
creditors enjoy a superior claim on business assets, while the owners'
personal creditors have an inferior, structurally subordinated claim.
To see how this works, it is useful first to introduce an important
distinction. Hansmann and Kraakman distinguish between two types
of asset partitioning: a strong form and a weak form. 23 The strong form
includes a "liquidation protection" feature, whereas the weak form does
not. "Liquidation protection" refers to the capacity of business owners'
creditors to liquidate the firm. 24 The distinction between strong- and
weak-form asset partitioning is best illustrated by comparing the
22. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390 (footnote omitted).
23. See id. at 394-95.
24. See id. In their subsequent paper with Squire, the authors modify their definition of
liquidation protection to include restrictions on the ability of owners themselves to force payout.
See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 3, at 1338 ("Liquidation protection restricts the
ability of both firm owners and their personal creditors to force the payout of an owner's share of
the firm's net assets."). But they view this owner-commitment role as distinctly less important,
since it can be largely accomplished through contractual means. See id. at 1341-43. In their
original paper, the authors characterize such owner "withdrawal rights" as a useful but not
essential aspect of organizational law. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 1, at 434-35, 437.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1312

[Vol. 70:4:1303

corporation to the partnership at will. When a corporate shareholder
becomes insolvent, the shareholder's personal creditors are not entitled
to force the firm into liquidation. At most, the personal creditors step
into the shareholder's shoes-they become shareholders. The corporate
form, then, exhibits strong-form asset partitioning. By contrast, the
partnership at will lacks liquidation protection; creditors of a bankrupt
partner can force a liquidation of the partnership. 25 This is the defining
feature of weak-form asset partitioning. Note that, even in weak-form
entities like the partnership at will, owners' personal creditors are
subordinated to business creditors in the distribution of business
assets. This priority rule sits at the core of both strong- and weak-form
asset partitioning.
Why is asset partitioning desirable? According to Hansmann
and Kraakman, asset partitioning-whether strong- or weak-formreduces businesses' cost of credit, primarily by reducing monitoring
costs. 2 6 To see why, imagine a firm with numerous individual owners.
In the absence of asset partitioning, the personal creditors of an
insolvent owner could levy directly against firm assets on an equal
footing with business creditors. (Assume for now that there are no
security interests.) This means that, in order to evaluate the risk of
lending to the firm, prospective business creditors would need to
evaluate the personal creditworthiness of each individual owner.
Obviously, this could be quite costly. And the problem goes deeper. Any
subsequent changes in the creditworthiness of the owners-or in their
identities, if ownership were to change hands-would impact business
creditors. Furthermore, owners themselves would need to monitor other
owners' creditworthiness, since the personal financial situation of
individual owners would affect the firm's cost of credit.
To solve this problem-at bottom, an information problembusiness creditors need assurance that their claims on business assets

25.
6 U.L.A.

§§

See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
315 (1914);

§ 801(5),

6 U.L.A. 479-80 (2015); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT

§ 32(2),

CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., 1 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP

3.05(d)(3)(v), 7.06(f) (2d ed. Supp. 2016-2).
26. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 1, at 399-403. The authors also note that strongform (unlike weak-form) asset partitioning protects going-concern value by preventing business
owners' creditors from prematurely liquidating business assets. See id. at 403-04. But this appears
to be less important to their analysis than the priority rule, which is present in the weak form as
well as the strong form. In addition, they briefly note that asset partitioning may promote risk
sharing by apportioning risk among owners and creditors according to risk appetite. See id. at 404.
Finally, the authors, together with Squire, note that strong- and weak-form asset partitioning may
reduce both managerial agency costs (another monitoring or informational function) and
administrative costs of bankruptcy. See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 3, at 134648. I think it is fair to say that the authors present reductions in appraisal, monitoring, and related
information costs as the main benefit of asset partitioning, at least in its weak form.
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are senior to those of the owners' personal creditors. The assetpartitioning feature of organizational law gives them this assurance.
Automatically, by operation of law, the claims of the owners' personal
creditors on business assets are subordinated. In a follow-up article
with coauthor Richard Squire, Hansmann and Kraakman demonstrate
that this asset-partitioning aspect of organizational law has been
ubiquitous as a historical matter, at least in the Western world. 27 In
particular, they investigate the attributes of partnership-type
organizational forms in several historical settings: ancient Rome,
medieval and Renaissance Italy, early modern England, and the United
States from the nineteenth century forward. They find in each case that
organizational forms had this creditor-priority feature.
A pivotal question is why asset partitioning would be infeasible
using just property and contract. Central to Hansmann and
Kraakman's theory is that "[t]he default rules of property and contract
law in effect provide that, absent contractual agreement to the contrary,
each [creditor of a business owner] has an equal-priority floating lien
upon the [owner]'s entire pool of assets as a guarantee of
performance." 28 In other words, all creditors stand on an equal footing
unless they specifically agree otherwise. To achieve seniority with
respect to business assets, then, business creditors would need to
extract from business owners credible promises that they "would obtain
from all of [their] personal creditors, both past and future, agreements
subordinating their claims" on business assets. 29
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that this would not be
workable, for two reasons. First, transaction costs would be high. The
subordination provisions would need to be drafted, and bargaining
would have to take place with each personal creditor. One might
question whether this would truly be prohibitively costly. One can
imagine a standard-form provision in which personal creditors would
agree to subordination in the division of any assets of the debtor that
are primarily used in business enterprise. There might occasionally be
some ambiguity as to precisely which assets are business assets, but
this issue should be manageable. After all, as Hansmann and
Kraakman acknowledge, 30 the same ambiguity arises in partnership

27.
28.
29.
30.

Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 3, at 1356-99.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 407.
Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 409 n.29; see also id. at 429 n.61.
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law-there is often a gray area in determining what constitutes
"partnership property." 3 1
Hansmann and Kraakman identify a second, more important
problem: moral hazard. Business creditors would have no reliable way
to monitor whether owners were in fact inserting subordination
provisions into all of their agreements with personal creditors. And the
owners would have a strong incentive not to procure such subordination
provisions. Hansmann and Kraakman explain:
By failing to obtain a subordination agreement with a personal creditor, the entrepreneur
and the personal creditor can externalize to the entrepreneur's business creditors a larger
portion of the potential costs of the entrepreneur's insolvency than the business creditors
had bargained for. For these reasons, in order for the entrepreneur's business creditors to
have faith in the entrepreneur's compliance with his promise to give them priority in his
business assets, they would have to engage in continuous monitoring of the entrepreneur's
32
contracts with all of his individual creditors-a task that generally would be infeasible.

Property and contract, then, can't do the trick. According to
Hansmann and Kraakman, what is needed is a way to "alter the default
rules" described above. 33 This is what organizational law accomplishes.
In effect, every creditor implicitly agrees that, if the borrower has an
ownership stake in a business entity, the creditor's claim on the assets
of the entity are automatically subordinated to the claims of entity
creditors. With organizational law, the argument goes, owners cannot
shirk their contractual obligations to procure subordination
agreements, because no such subordination agreements are needed in
the first place. Moral hazard becomes much less of an issue.
How convincing is this argument? Hansmann and Kraakman
note that their moral-hazard argument hinges on the idea that "[t]his
special contractual term that organizational law imposes is . ..

a

mandatory term. If it were just a default term, waivable by the parties,
then the problems of moral hazard discussed above would return." 34 But
is it truly mandatory? There is nothing to prevent an entity from
contractually guaranteeing the debts of one or more of its owners. Such
intragroup guarantees are very common in the corporate context;
affiliated entities within a corporate group often guarantee each other's
liabilities. These guarantees are typically constructed so as to allow the

31. See, e.g., HURT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3.02 ("The question of whether property is owned
by the partnership or by individual partners can arise in many ways."); NATHANIEL LINDLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 322 (London, W. Maxwell & Son, 5th ed. 1888) ("It is often
a difficult matter to determine what is to be regarded as partnership property, and what is to be
regarded as the separate property of each partner.").
32. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 408.
33. Id. at 409.
34. Id.
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creditor to proceed directly against the guarantor without taking action
against the primary obligor. Such upstream guarantees override the
subordination supplied by asset partitioning. 35
It might initially seem puzzling that corporate groups would
bother partitioning up their assets, only to functionally reintegrate
them through the use of intragroup guarantees and other contractual
arrangements. Scholars have commented on this phenomenon and
offered theories to explain it. Richard Squire suggests that this practice
reflects a form of shareholder opportunism-a way to take advantage of
creditors. 36 Anthony Casey offers a more benign interpretation,
suggesting that such structures afford optionality to creditors in
enforcing their claims against debtors.3 7 For present purposes, what
matters is not why entities issue such guarantees, but the very fact that
they can do so. This capacity means that the "special contractual term"
supplied by organizational law is not mandatory-which means that
moral hazard persists despite asset partitioning.38 In principle, it is no
easier to monitor the absence of guarantees than it is to monitor the
presence of subordination agreements.

35. That upstream guarantees override asset partitioning is not merely an academic point;
in fact it has major implications for modern financial stability regulation. A central component of
recent financial reforms in the United States and abroad has been the development of new "Total
Loss Absorbing Capacity" ("TLAC") principles, which require the largest financial firms to
maintain loss-absorbing capacity at the holding company level in order to provide a buffer of
protection to (more sensitive) operating subsidiary liabilities. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD,
PRINCIPLES ON LOSS-ABSORBING AND RECAPITALISATION CAPACITY OF G-SIBs IN RESOLUTION:
TOTAL LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY (TLAC) TERM SHEET (2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/

uploads/TLAC-Principles-and-Term-Sheet-for-publication-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2VRW2VN]. In its TLAC implementing release, the Federal Reserve indicated that firms subject to the
rule would be prohibited from having any "[holding company] liabilities that are guaranteed by a
subsidiary of the .. . holding company ('upstream guarantees')." Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity,
Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company Requirements for Systemically Important U.S.
Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate Holding Companies of Systemically Important
Foreign Banking Organizations; Regulatory Capital Deduction for Investments in Certain
Unsecured Debt of Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,926,
74,944 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 217, 252). Structural subordination
of holding company claimants, the Fed noted, "could be undermined if a liability of the covered
holding company is subject to an upstream guarantee, because the effect of such a guarantee is to
subject the guaranteeing subsidiary (and, ultimately, its creditors) to the losses that would
otherwise be imposed on the holding company's creditors." Id. at 74,946. In other words, upstream
guarantees defeat asset partitioning.
36. See Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605
(2011).
37. See Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitionsand Creditors'
Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015).
38. In other work, Hansmann acknowledges that cross-guarantees undermine the creditormonitoring efficiencies of asset partitioning, but without explicitly recognizing that such
guarantees render asset partitioning nonmandatory. See Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann,
Legal Entities as TransferableBundles of Contracts, 111 MICH. L. REV. 715, 722 n.9 (2013).
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Now, it is true that the law imposes certain hurdles to
implementing such guarantees. Where the entity has multiple owners,
an individual owner may lack the legal authority to bind the entity to a
guarantee of her personal obligations. The governance structure of the
entity may need to authorize it. For any number of reasons, co-owners
might be disinclined to grant such benefits to their colleagues, even if
there is mutuality. But note the underlying source of this impediment:
the co-owner cannot pledge any business assets to her personal
creditors because none of the assets in question are hers to pledge. In
other words, the hurdle is a function of property relinquishment.
B. Security Interests and the Information Problem
The law of security interests offers another vantage point for
critical analysis of the asset-partitioning theory of organizational law.
It should be apparent that secured credit accomplishes something very
similar to weak-form asset partitioning. Secured creditors have a prior
claim on the collateral; unsecured creditors are subordinated, whether
or not they explicitly agree to it. As one leading scholar provocatively (if
somewhat hyperbolically) puts it, "Security is an agreement between A
and B that C take nothing." 39 (Note the divergence from Hansmann and
Kraakman's "default rules of property and contract" described above.)
The notion of unilateral subordination might initially seem unfair, but
presumably unsecured creditors are aware of this risk and will charge
a corresponding premium up front. 40 The prospect of nonconsensual
subordination is part of the "rules of the game" to which every voluntary
unsecured creditor implicitly consents. 41 With security interests, the
hypothesized problem of entering into subordination agreements with
each personal creditor, and of monitoring such agreements, disappears.
Importantly, security interests themselves can be replicated
through more primitive tools of property and contract. 42 The point will
be familiar enough to commercial lawyers, but it bears emphasis
39. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994).
40. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-48 (1979).
41. Involuntary creditors (tort victims) are another matter, a point well-recognized in the
literature. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 882-83 (1996); LoPucki, supra note 39, at 1899;
Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full PriorityDebates,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1377-83 (1997).
42. In fact, such transactions were historical precursors to the development of security
interest law. See, e.g., BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY:

CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 13 (4th ed. 2007) ("When first conceived centuries ago, the real
estate mortgage took the form of a sale subject to defeasance.").
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nonetheless. The repurchase agreement or "repo" transactionubiquitous in the financial sector-consists of the sale of a security
coupled with a forward purchase of the same security at a slightly
higher price. 43 It is economically equivalent to a secured borrowing; the
"seller" (borrower) receives cash today and pays it back with interest on
the maturity date. If the seller fails to make the required payment, the
"buyer" (lender) has the security as collateral. Practically speaking, the
repo lender has a lien on the purchased security. In the case of
nonfinancial property, the sale-leaseback transaction can be used to
achieve a similar result. 4 4 The party seeking financing sells property for
cash and then leases it back; the cash proceeds are the amount
"borrowed," and the lease payments constitute the loan repayment. If
the seller (borrower) defaults on its lease payments, the buyer (lender)
has the underlying property as collateral. The seller may retain an
option to repurchase the property at a nominal price once all the lease
payments (covering principal and interest) have been made. This too is
economically equivalent to a secured borrowing. The upshot of this
analysis is that weak-form asset partitioning-nonconsensual
subordination of a set of creditors-is, at least under some
circumstances, achievable without organizational law. Indeed, it is
achievable without any dedicated "law" of security interests.
While Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge that security
interests offer something resembling weak-form asset partitioning,
they contend that security interests, at least as they exist today, are too
cumbersome to serve as a substitute for organizational law. The reason
is that operating businesses are dynamic, not static. The issue is not so
much asset turnover as creditor turnover. Asset turnover can be
managed through the creation of broad floating liens. The modern U.S.
law of security interests-as embodied in Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")-recognizes liens of this type. A U.C.C.
financing statement may specify collateral in quite general terms. 45
Once filed, the statement may cover both present and after-acquired
collateral of the type described. 46 In addition, the financing statement
may cover future advances from the same creditor. 47 What the U.C.C.
does not countenance, however, is floating secured creditors. To fully

43. For a general overview of the repo market, see MARCIA STIGUM & ANTHONY CRESCENZI,
STIGUM'S MONEY MARKET 531-79 (4th ed. 2007).
44. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH

29-30 (7th ed. 2011).
45.

U.C.C.

46.
47.

U.C.C.
U.C.C.

§ 9-108 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
§ 9-204(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIP. LAW COMM'N 2015).
§9-204(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
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mimic the weak-form partitioning afforded by organizational law, a new
U.C.C. filing would be required for each new creditor-that is, every
time the firm enters into a contract with a party not already reflected
in the firm's files.
Hansmann and Kraakman submit that this "would obviously be
an infeasible burden in a business of any complexity." 48 Interestingly,
though, the authors point out that a "substantially more flexible" law of
security interests "might provide a workable substitute for
organizational law, at least so far as establishing priority of claims is
involved (though it still would not provide liquidation protection)." 49
Indeed, with a sufficiently evolved law of security interests-in
particular, one that allowed for floating secured creditors-"the line
between organizational law and the law of secured interests may
become quite indistinct."5 0
It is instructive to consider whether such an evolved system of
security interests would be of much value to prospective creditors.
Douglas Baird has persuasively argued that the principal function of
Article 9's notice-filing system is not to give notice to unsecured
creditors-who rarely use it-but rather to allow secured creditors to
"easily stake claims to the property of the debtor and determine the
priority of competing claims."51 The key point is that, with the noticefiling system, a prospective secured creditor can avoid relying to any
substantial degree on information or assurances from the debtor. If she
sees in the files that an asset of the debtor is unencumbered, she can
establish a security interest in the asset with full confidence of first
priority (the first-to-file rule 52 ). If she sees that an asset is encumbered,
she can see the identities of the existing lienholders, and she may then
negotiate directly with them to sort out priorities (e.g., by procuring
subordination agreements from each of them). None of this requires any

48. Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 1, at 418. It is not hard to imagine how this process
could become quite routinized, adding negligible marginal cost to transactions of any size. Filings
might not be economical for the smallest transactions, but the smallest creditors are not doing
credit analysis in any case. Accordingly, the monitoring-cost advantages of asset partitioning do
not apply.
49. Id. at 422. There is no doubt that security interests have a property dimension. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 1-201 (b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) (" 'Security interest' means an
interest in personal property . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES

§

1.1 (AM. LAW

INST. 1997); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 833 (2001) (arguing that security interests "lie at the intersection of property
and contract").
50. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 423.
51. See Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filingand the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 53, 55 (1983).
52. U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
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information or assurances from the debtor itself. This is crucial, because
information and assurances from the debtor may be unreliable, owing
to the moral-hazard problem described above.
Compare asset partitioning in organizational law. A general
claimant on a legal entity (partnership or corporation) is in a position
analogous to the position of secured creditors under the hypothetical
"flexible" or "evolved" system of security interests just described, in
which secured creditors may float. Unlike a secured party under Article
9, the entity claimant must still rely on the debtor itself for information
about the status of her claim. How much other debt does the debtor
have, or plan to incur? Has the entity guaranteed third-party debtsperhaps debts of the entity's owners-such that those other debts
represent claims on business assets that are pari passu with entity
debts? Even if the creditor is satisfied with this information at the time
credit is extended, the debtor could pile on more obligations thereafter,
diluting the value of the creditor's claim. Of course, the creditor may
require that the debtor agree to restrictive covenants on these matters.
But the debtor has the moral-hazard incentive described above, and the
claimant has the same monitoring problem. In short, when it comes to
dealing with information and monitoring problems arising from moral
hazard, organizational law offers but a pale shadow of what the modern
law of security interests affords. 53
None of this is to suggest that the asset-partitioning feature of
organizational law provides no informational efficiencies at all. But it
does raise questions about how substantial those informational benefits
are likely to be. Even with organizational law, general creditors of legal
entities face major informational challenges, and such credit
relationships are inherently afflicted with moral-hazard incentives. The
contribution of organizational law in overcoming these problems is
arguably rather incremental and modest. If we have a sense that
organizational law offers something indispensable to commercial
affairs, it is worth looking at other possibilities. The next Part offers a
different, though complementary, theory-one that centers around not
creditors' rights but relations among co-owners.

53. Richard Squire has made the intriguing argument that, in "asymmetric" or recourse
security arrangements (where the secured creditor is entitled to a deficiency claim against the
debtor if the collateral proves inadequate), the informational efficiencies of security interests are
in fact less substantial than is commonly supposed. See Richard Squire, The Casefor Symmetry in
Creditors'Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 814-35 (2009). He does not, however, specifically address
Baird's analysis of how the notice-filing system provides certainty to secured claimants regarding
the status of the debtor's property interests (i.e., absence of existing encumbrances).
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL LAW AS PROPERTY RELINQUISHMENT

It is indisputable that organizational law supplies asset
partitioning, but does it supply anything else that could arguably be of
equal or even greater importance? This Part describes another core
function of organizational law-one that could not be replicated through
contracting alone.
A. A Stylized Illustration
Suppose five unique assets can be configured together to produce
cash flows whose net present value exceeds the total value of the
unconfigured assets-going-concern value. The five assets are owned
separately by five individuals. The individuals sign a contract (assume
there is no such thing as "partnership" law or any other type of
organizational law) by which they agree to configure the assets and split
the future business profits. Legal ownership of the assets remains
unchanged. What happens if one of the individuals thereafter discovers
that she can get more for her asset by deploying it elsewhere? She may
choose to remove her asset from the configuration, breach the contract,
and pay damages to the other four. (Set aside for now the possibility of
counteroffer by the other four.)
In theory, the other four are made whole-standard contract
damages leave them no worse off than if the defector had performedand are therefore indifferent. In practice, this is unrealistic. Awarding
accurate damages in this scenario requires accurate business valuation.
Courts are ill-equipped to estimate such damages, and doing so is
administratively expensive. Further, as a matter of black-letter
contract law, plaintiffs cannot recover speculative damages. 54 Because
future business earnings are inherently speculative, standard contract
damages will be seriously undercompensatory in this context. (I address
the possibility of nonstandard contract damages below.)
The problem goes deeper than asset diversion; it also relates to
governance. Presumably the co-venturers included a governance
provision in their contract-say, majority rules. And presumably each,
as principal, appointed one or more of the others as agent(s) to operate
the business. But what happens if one of the co-venturers thereafter
declines to submit her asset to the majority's will? The others could file
suit for breach of contract, but the harm is quite speculative; how should

54.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Uncertainty as

a Limitation on Damages").
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damages be computed? Nor does agency law solve this governance
problem. Appointing the others as agents does not nullify the errant coventurer's property rights as principal. She still owns the asset in
question and can revoke the other venturers' agency status. Their use
of the asset would then constitute conversion or trespass, perhaps
giving rise to criminalsanction. Simply put, each co-venturer's separate
property right over a specific business asset "trumps" contract and
agency. An excess of property rights frustrates the parties' ability to
commit ex ante.
Can property law's concurrent estates-joint tenancy and
tenancy in common-furnish a solution? Suppose that, at the inception
of the venture, each co-venturer took a direct concurrent interest in
each of the five assets. This would end the asymmetry; they would all
be on an equal footing with respect to each specific asset. On reflection,
though, concurrent estates are no panacea. In fact they might make
matters worse. Three dimensions of concurrent estates render them
unsuitable. First, each concurrent holder may use and possess the
entire property for any lawful purpose. Second, each may convey his
interest to third parties, even without the consent of the other
concurrent holder(s). Third, in concurrent estates, each owner has a
right to partition the underlying asset, thereby fragmenting
ownership.5 5 Hence, the problem of defection-the undoing of the asset
configuration-still exists. The parties could of course enter into a
contract not to exercise these property rights. But even if such a
contract were judicially enforceable-which is doubtful 6-this only
collapses us back into the problem described above: the inadequacy of
contractual remedies in this context.5 7
In addition to the defection problem, our co-venturers face the
prospect of what might be called involuntary asset diversion. Suppose
one of the co-venturers dies and his property passes to heirs/devisees;
or suppose he is forced into bankruptcy and his property enters a
bankruptcy estate for the satisfaction of personal creditors; or suppose
his property becomes subject to a judgment/execution lien. The
successors to his property, including any property which he has
contractually dedicated to the business, are not bound by the business

55. For an overview of partition law, see Candace Reid, Note, Partitionsin Kind: A Preference
Without Favor, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 855 (1986).
56. As Hansmann and Kraakman note (citing sources), "An agreement not to partition is
unenforceable as an invalid restraint on alienation unless it is for a reasonable time only."
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 412 n.32.
57. For analogous reasons, conveying all the property to one co-venturer, subject to a contract
regarding governance and profit sharing, is no answer either. The power imbalance is too great.
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contract; there is no contractual privity.5 8 Such successors can use the
property however they wish, and the business co-venturers have no
contractual recourse.
What the co-venturers need, it seems, is a way for each
individual, on behalf of himself and his successors/heirs, to relinquish
any legally cognizable property interest in specific business assets. All
the co-venturers must be on an equal footing as mere agents with
respect to each specific business asset, with none of them having the
status of principal. Contract can't get them there; contract doesn't
extinguish property rights. Agency can't get them there; agency law is
empowering, not disempowering. Concurrent property estates can't get
them there; indeed, concurrent estates only serve to multiply ownership
rights rather than nullify them.
Organizational law offers a solution: it allows the individual coventurers to divest themselves of all direct property interests in specific
business assets. As Part III will show in greater detail, this was true
even in the traditional common law of partnership-despite outward
appearances to the contrary. Traditional partnership law achieved
property relinquishment through three complementary equitable
doctrines. First, when co-venturers used the partnership form, the
remedy for removing any specific asset from the configuration, or using
it for personal benefit, was disgorgement: the errant partner had to
forfeit any resulting (past and future) gain. This quintessentially
equitable remedy generally wasn't (and isn't) available in contract, and
it practically eliminates the incentive to defect in the first place. Second,
a knowing purchaser of the wrongly diverted asset was obligated to
apply the asset solely to partnership purposes. Essentially, the
purchaser took the asset as trustee for the firm-and this was true even
if the defecting partner held formal legal title to the asset in question
before selling it. Partnership law thus infused all partnership property,
both real and personal, with an implicit in rem covenant that "ran with
the asset." This was (and is) patently impossible in contract, owing to
the absence of privity. Third, to top it all off, at the termination of a
partnership, no partner (nor any successor/heir thereof) had any right
to any specific business asset; rather, each had the option to insist on a
sale of the entire business, under the supervision of a court-appointed
manager/receiver if necessary. Formal legal title to business assets was

58. It is well-settled that a contract is dissolved upon the death of a party whose remaining
performance obligations consisted of something more than simple payment or "mere ministerial"
matters. Kelley v. Thompson Land Co., 164 S.E. 667, 668 (W. Va. 1932). Such a contract therefore
does not bind the estate or heirs of the deceased, though the counterparty may sometimes be
entitled to monetary recovery in quantum meruit. See id.
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thereby consolidated in the purchaser(s)-often consisting of one or
more of the partners themselveS 59 -leaving the asset configuration
undisturbed and going-concern value unimpaired. This muscular,
equitable judicial intervention was (and is) entirely foreign to a
contractual setting. In combination, these three doctrines divested
partners of any meaningful direct property interest in specific business
assets, notwithstanding formal legal title.
The foregoing stylized description is admittedly somewhat
artificial, but it gets to the heart of the matter.6 0 Property
relinquishment, I contend, is among the central functions of
organizational law, and there is no obvious reason to regard it as any
less important than Hansmann-Kraakman asset partitioning. Indeed,
one could reasonably argue that asset partitioning is secondary-a
happy byproduct of the solution to the commitment problem.
B. Remedial Minimalism in Contract Law
Implicit in the foregoing argument is a claim about the nature
of contractual remedies. The point can be illustrated through the lens
of Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's famous and influential
distinction between property rules and liability rules. 6 1 In the
59. This was certainly true in the traditional partnership, as shown in Section II.B.3 below.
Commentators have emphasized the same point in relation to the modern partnership. See, e.g.,
ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 489-90 (1968):
Theoretically, liquidation [upon dissolution] calls for a sale of partnership property to
strangers, payment of debts, and division of proceeds among the partners. Factually,
the most logical buyers are often the remaining partners. . . . If the remaining partners
desire to continue operations without liquidation of the business (as distinct from
liquidation of the firm as a legal entity), they must settle with the outgoing interest and
acquire its rights;
HURT ET AL., supra note 25, § 7.01(b):
Although the language of the U.P.A. appears to stress liquidation of the partnership on
dissolution, in fact, after dissolution of the partnership entity the partners quite often
continue the business of the partnership.... It is therefore more accurate to
characterize the partnership business as continuing indefinitely, unless the partners
decide to wind it up, than to regard winding up of the business as a necessary or even
usual consequence of dissolution. When the partnership business does continue,
"winding up" . . . occurs, if at all, only in the technical sense of paying off the outgoing
partner or estate, just as "dissolution" occurs only in the sense of the end of the
relationship among particular partners.
60. In particular, the assumption that each co-venturer contributed some real asset to the
business is unrealistic; more likely, one or more co-venturers would commit financial capital,
which would then be used to purchase business assets. But this assumption is a strategic
simplification that has no bearing on the analysis. Without organizational law, property interests
in any assets purchased after formation would still need to be held by one or more of the coventurers, raising all the problems discussed above.
61. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21.
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Calabresi-Melamed framework, when an entitlement is protected by a
property rule, the holder has veto power: Someone wishing to remove
the entitlement must buy it from the holder in a voluntary transaction.
By contrast, when an entitlement is protected by a liability rule, it may
be violated so long as the violator is willing to pay an objectively
determined value for it.
My argument rests in part on the proposition that AngloAmerican contract law is a liability-rule rather than a property-rule
system. 62 Or, to put the point slightly differently, contract law is
characterized by remedial minimalism. At a certain level, this
proposition is indisputable. Contract law's remedial minimalism has
several dimensions, but it is perhaps best illustrated by considering two
well-established doctrines that are familiar to any law student. First,
in contract disputes, courts almost always decline to enforce remedies
that are more draconian than expectation damages, even when the
parties agree to them (so-called "penalty clauses"). 63 Second, specific
performance is a rare and extraordinary remedy, limited to cases in
which (1) damages are extremely hard to measure (for example, a
contract for the sale of unique goods, such as land)64 and (2) the
transaction in question is quite discrete, such that the court need not
expend effort in monitoring and enforcing ongoing compliance with its
order. 65 To be sure, courts have occasionally departed from these
limiting doctrines, but such exceptions only prove the rule.
Some scholars have questioned the wisdom of these limiting
doctrines. The nonenforcement of penalty clauses impinges on
contractual autonomy; why shouldn't courts respect the wishes of the

62. This point is well-recognized. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 351, 354 (1978) ("The Anglo-American law of contracts protects most contract rights
with a liability rule, only a few with a property rule."); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2187 ("[I]n contract law, liability rules, not property rules, do
indeed constitute the background default rule.").
63. This doctrine is centuries old. See Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v.
Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351, 351 n.2. The preeminence of expectation
damages in contract disputes dates to the sixteenth century. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss
or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principlein Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339,
1351 (1985).
64.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§§

358-60 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

65. See id. § 366 ("Effect of Difficulty in Enforcement or Supervision"). In contrast to common
law jurisdictions, civil law jurisdictions award specific performance as the standard remedy for
breach of contract. It may very well be that the remedial dimension of organizational law carries
less significance in civil law jurisdictions. For a comparative perspective on the functions of
corporate law, covering several major common law and civil law jurisdictions, see REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH (2d ed. 2009).
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parties by enforcing such clauses? 66 Specific performance would give the
nonbreaching party the benefit of her bargain; why shouldn't it be
granted as a matter of course?67 But these long-standing doctrines can
be justified on administrative grounds: they minimize the burden on
the courts. In the case of specific performance, the public resource cost
is obvious and widely recognized. The court must maintain its
involvement in the matter to ensure substantial compliance with its
order. The promisor may have a strong incentive to shirk-especially if
the relationship has soured-inviting more adjudication. By contrast,
with a money judgment, the court ends its involvement with the matter,
and the promisee is routed into the ordinary mechanisms of debt
collection. From an administrative standpoint, money judgments are
clearly less burdensome than specific performance.
In the case of penalty clauses, the analysis is somewhat less
obvious but no less compelling. A true penalty clause gives the
nonbreaching party a windfall in the event of breach; he prefers breach
to performance. He may therefore have an incentive to identify and
litigate technical breaches or take (perhaps furtive) steps to frustrate
the counterparty's performance. Of course, the counterparty will have
taken these incentives into account ex ante when agreeing to the
penalty clause. Assuming both parties are rational and contractual
duress is absent, the penalty clause presumably enhances the parties'
joint welfare. But because such clauses create a heightened risk of
litigation, they impose a negative externality on the public by
consuming scarce judicial resources.68 Lawmakers might reasonably
conclude that the social cost of enforcing penalty clauses outweighs the

66. Richard Posner-famous for championing the efficiency of the common law-lists the
nonenforcement of penalty clauses first in his catalog of "the most important contradictions to the
efficiency theory of the common law." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 252 (7th

ed. 2007).
67. A number of scholars have argued on efficiency grounds for greater availability of specific
performance in contract disputes. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law
After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 836 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Case
for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance:Toward a Unified Theory of ContractRemedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984).
68. For a related argument that focuses on the administrative costs of enforcing penalty
clauses, see Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts:Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1981).
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social benefit.69 (The maxim that "equity abhors a forfeiture"7 0 thus has
a plausible efficiency rationale, rooted in costs of administration.)
Other aspects of contract doctrine reinforce this remedial
minimalism. The disallowance of speculative damages streamlines the
calculation of monetary remedies; the adjudicator need not attach
probabilities to endless permutations of outcomes. More fundamentally,
the liability-rule nature of contract doctrine is evident in the virtual
absence of punitive damages, 7 1 and the complete absence of criminal
sanctions, for contractual violations. Calabresi and Melamed described
criminal punishment as a tool for deterring "attempts to convert
property rules into liability rules." 72 The remedial minimalism of

contract law embodies the reverse strategy. That is to say, contract
doctrine resists attempts to convert liability rules into property rules.7 3
69. While liability rules consume fewer judicial resources than property rules when the
underlying entitlement consists of a third party's positive performance-as is normally the case in
contract disputes-the situation is reversed when the underlying entitlement consists of a negative
obligation (i.e., noninterference). This is because it is generally far more difficult to locate technical
defects in, or to frustrate others' performance of, negative obligations; try finding technical defects
in, or frustrating the performance of, my obligation not to steal your television. This analysis
provides a novel answer to the question why, if "efficient breach" is tolerated, "efficient theft" is
not; in the latter case, the breaching party's obligation is negative, making the property rule
relatively inexpensive. (For analysis of the efficient theft problem, see Daniel Friedmann, The
Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-13 (1989).) It also explains why courts are quite
willing to specifically enforce those categories of contracts that do impose negative obligationsmost notably, noncompetition agreements. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992) (enforcing exclusivity clause through a permanent injunction). Generally
speaking, the coupling of property rule protection and positive performance obligations is
extraordinary, and it is the province of "fiduciary" relations. Cf. Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex
Ante and SharingEx Post, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 216 (Andrew

S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) ("A fiduciary [unlike a contractual counterparty] must take
the initiative on her beneficiary's behalf. Indeed, the point of fiduciary relation-written into its
generic structure-is for the fiduciary to take the initiative in this way."). Like Markovits, I am
skeptical of Easterbrook and Fischel's well-known contractualist interpretation of fiduciary duties;
even they acknowledge that the disgorgement remedy that characterizes fiduciary law "looks
distinctly anticontractual." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 441 (1993).
70.

See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., 1 A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§ 454

n.b (3rd

ed. 1905).
71.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 355

(AM. LAW INST.

1981) ("Punitive

damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is
also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.").
72. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1126.
73. The main exception to minimalistic (liability-rule) protection of contractual entitlements
consists of judicial recognition of tortious interference with contract. See Lillian R. BeVier,
ReconsideringInducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 879 (1990) (noting that tortious interference reflects
a "property-rule remedy" in the contractual context); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference
with Contract Versus "Efficient"Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131,
133 (1999) ("[T]ortious interference should be seen as part of a larger body of law designed to accord
property protection to a particular entitlement, contract rights."); Deepa Varadarajan, Note,
Tortious Interference and the Law of Contract: The Case for Specific Performance Revisited, 111
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Recognizing that contract law is imbued with remedial
minimalism-that it is, arguably for good reason, a liability-rule
system-is important. For there may be domains in which the social
benefits of departing from this remedial minimalism outweigh the
associated administrative costs. Jointly owned productive enterprisewhich is immensely valuable to society-appears to be one such domain.
As shown above, contractual bonds are not strong enough to provide the
requisite level of commitment in this setting. Co-venturers need a
reliable way to prevent a fellow co-venturer from taking her toy and
going home. With organizational law, the governance structure of the
entity may enforce property rules against any individual co-venturer,
as well as against any successor/heir thereof. Asking whether
organizational forms are "merely contract," then, is something more
than an empty taxonomical question.7 4

III. PROPERTY RELINQUISHMENT IN TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIP LAW
Is property relinquishment part of the "deep" structure of
organizational law? This Part tackles this question by considering what
is unquestionably the hardest case for my thesis, at least within AngloAmerican law: the traditional common law of partnership. (As noted
above, the corporation and the modern partnership are easy cases,
because shareholders and partners, respectively, clearly have no
ownership interest in specific business assets.75 ) I focus in particular on
the nineteenth century, which offers a kind of historical sweet spot.
Partnership law had yet to be modernized through codification; at the
same time, this was the heyday of treatise writing in Anglo-American
law, affording modern scholars a set of contemporaneous and definitive
statements of the law.
Superficially, traditional partnership law appears inconsistent
with the property-relinquishment theory of organizational law
articulated above, because partners held formal legal title to business
assets. And the existing scholarly literature in this area, insofar as it

YALE L.J. 735, 736 (2001) ("[Tortious interference] has puzzled proponents of efficient-breach
theory because it does in the three-party context what is rarely done in the two-party context under
contract law: It protects the promisee's contractual right with a property rule."). Notably for
present purposes, the modern doctrine of tortious interference is of very recent vintage-arising
only in the mid-nineteenth century.
74. To the extent that the foregoing argument is vulnerable to the charge of essentializing
contract law, the same charge applies to the asset-partitioning theory, which, as shown above, is
premised on specified background rules that are said to be internal to property and contract.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. The private trust is also an easy case, since
legal and equitable title are divorced. See supra note 17.
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addresses the issue at all, largely reflects this superficial
understanding. I aim to show, however, that property relinquishment
was in fact a core feature of traditional partnership law. First, I show
that partnership property was special: even though legal title to
partnership assets was lodged in one or more individual partners,
equity in effect overrode the legal formalities. I then demonstrate the
underlying doctrinal basis for this conclusion. I show that partnership
law had the three features noted above: the "disgorgement feature," the
"in rem feature," and the "title consolidation" feature. In combination,
these features allowed co-owners to structure their relations in a way
that could not have been reliably replicated through contract,
concurrent property estates, and agency law.
A. The Status of PartnershipProperty
At common law, a partnership was understood to be an
"aggregate" of persons rather than a legal entity. 76 Essential to the
aggregate conception was that legal title to business property was held
by the partners in their individual capacities. Insofar as the incidents
of ownership followed legal title, each business asset was directly
"owned" by one or more partners. It is important, however, to look
beneath the surface. A review of the partnership treatises of the
nineteenth century reveals that the common law of partnership
effectively cleaved the incidents of ownership from legal title.7 7
Theophilus Parsons began his 1867 partnership treatise with a
discussion of the peculiar nature of partnership property.
"[P]artnership has been compared to tenancy in common, and also to
joint tenancy; and has been said to be one or other of these, modified in
certain ways," he wrote.78 "But this is no more true than that tenancy
in common or joint tenancy is a modified partnership. The three things
are essentially distinct.

. .

. [A]nd the law of each must be sought for in

itself." 79 Specifically, Parsons noted that "[p]artnership is ... unlike
tenancy in common in that each co-tenant is entitled, as against his cotenants, to a specific share as interest in the common property in
specie . . . ."s0 Partnership was different. "[I]t is quite clear that [a

76. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT commissioners' prefatory note, 6 U.L.A. 2 (2015).
77. The leading modern partnership treatise reaches a similar conclusion in describing the
traditional common law of partnership. See HURT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3.04(a).
78.

THEOPHILUS PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 2-3 (Boston, Little,

Brown & Co. 1867).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2 n.b.
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partner] can appropriate nothing to himself," 8 1 he wrote. Indeed, "no
general principle of the law of partnership is better settled than that
nothing is to be considered the share of any one partner but his
proportion of the residue on the balancing of the partnership
accounts."8 2 Parsons concluded that every partner is obligated "to use
the property for their benefit, whose property it is; that is, for the
benefit of the whole as one concern, or one body, for so it is owned." 8 3
Using the language of trusteeship, Parsons suggested that legal title
was divorced from beneficial ownership:
As a general principle which will sometimes be of much use in determining the rights and
obligations of copartners, it may be said that all partners are regarded somewhat as
trustees for the firm.... [A] copartner has powers, opportunities, and duties in relation
to the partnership, very similar to those which a trustee has in relation to his
[beneficiaries].84

While partnership was viewed as aggregate, not entity, individual
partners nevertheless lacked any cognizable ownership interest in any
specific item of partnership property. Individual property rights were
subsumed.
Writing a quarter of a century earlier, Joseph Story agreed.
"Partners differ from mere part-owners of goods and chattels in several
respects," he wrote in his partnership treatise, first published in 1841.85
For in joint tenancy and tenancy in common "each party has a separate
and distinct, although an undivided, interest" in each asset, "whereas
86
in partnership the partners are joint owners of the whole property."
Story concluded:
The true nature, character, and extent of the rights and interests of partners in the
partnership capital, stock, funds, and effects, is, therefore, to be ascertained by the
doctrines of law applicable to that relation, and not by the mere analogies furnished by
87
joint tenancy, or by tenancy in common.

Story emphasized that these principles applied with equal force
to real property, notwithstanding the technicalities of real estate law.8 8
"Nor is there in reality, as between the partners themselves, any
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 167 n.q.
Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 231.

85.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 125 (Boston, Little, Brown

& Co., 7th ed. 1881).
86. Id. at 128-29.
87. Id. at 129.
88. Modern observers have not always grasped this subtlety. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 20,
at 409 n.65 ("In the case of real estate and other property held by the partnership, the partners
would be considered 'tenants in common' and each would be considered to have a direct interest in
the real estate, in proportion to his or her share in the profits.").
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difference whether the partnership property held for the purposes of the
trade or business consists of personal or movable property, or of real or
immovable property, or of both," he wrote. 9 Here the distinction
between legal and equitable ownership became paramount. "It is true
that, at law, real or immovable property is deemed to belong to the
persons in whose name the title by conveyance stands," wrote Story.90
But equity overrode these formalities.
[Hiowever the title may stand at law, or in whosesoever name or names it may be, the
real estate belonging to the partnership will, in equity, be treated as belonging to the
partnership, like its personal funds . .. and the parties in whose names it stands, as
owners of the legal title, will be held to be trustees of the partnership, and accountable
91
accordingly to the partners . . . [as] beneficiaries of the same.

Echoing Parsons, Story here uses language of trusteeship when
discussing the nature of partnership property, thereby indicating that
legal title did not imply beneficial ownership.
Niel Gow's 1830 partnership treatise accords with those of
Parsons and Story. "[E]ach partner is left in possession [of partnership
property] as a trustee for all," he wrote, "to the extent of enabling each
to call upon all to apply the partnership effects to the purposes to which
they ought to be applied." 92 A partner has an interest in the partnership
"but not a separate interest in any particular part of the partnership
property . . . ."93 Thus "nothing is to be considered as his share but his
proportion of the residue in the balance of the account." 94 To avoid any
doubt: "One partner has no claim upon his individual proportion of a
specific article, but is entitled only to an account of the produce of the
aggregate joint effects." 9 5
Gow, like Story, devoted particular attention to real property,
and he reached the same conclusion. "Courts of law, it is true, must look
to the legal estate," he wrote. 96 "But courts of equity, unfettered by
technical rules, seek to effectuate the intention of the parties . . . and

they decree the person in whom the legal estate vests to be a trustee for
those beneficially interested." 97 According to Gow, "[Wihere real estates
are purchased with the partnership funds, but conveyed only to one
89.
90.
91.

STORY, supranote 85, at 129.
Id.
Id. at 130.

92.

NIEL Gow, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 292 (Philadelphia,

Robert H. Small, 2d ed. 1830).
93. Id. at 47.
94. Id. at 119.
95. Id. at 256-57.
96. Id. at 48.
97. Id.
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partner, they are, nevertheless, partnership property." 98 And again:
"Nor . .. does it matter that the freehold interest purchased by the firm
is conveyed to one partner. Such a conveyance does not alter the nature
of the purchase, nor affect the rights of the other partners." 99 All
partners are on a precisely equal footing, regardless of legal title.
Nathaniel Lindley's 1888 partnership treatise listed several
differences between partnership property and mere co-ownership under
concurrent property estates. Among them was that an ordinary coowner "can, without the consent of the others, transfer his interest to a
stranger, so as to put him in the same position as regards to the other
owners as the transferor himself was before the transfer. A partner
cannot do this."10 0 In addition, like the other treatise authors described
above, Lindley observed that "[t]he mere fact that the property in
question was purchased by one partner in his own name is immaterial,"
as "he will be deemed to hold the property in trust for the firm."10 1
A widely cited law review article published around the turn of
the twentieth century summed up the common law's treatment of
partnership property. "[T]he partner's interest in firm assets is not a
tenancy in common, nor a joint tenancy, nor any other sort of a tenancy
in the assets themselves; he has no ownership at all in concrete chattels,
but an interest in any surplus that may remain after firm debts are
liquidated and partners' accounts balanced," wrote the author. 102 "If no
one partner has any interest in the firm assets themselves, it
necessarily follows that all of them have none." 103 In this respect at
least, the traditional partnership turns out to have been more entity
than aggregate.
B. The DoctrinalMechanisms of Property Relinquishment
But what does it mean, in functional terms, to say that
individual partners relinquished their ownership rights in specific
business assets, despite retaining legal title? I contend that this
transformation of property rights was effectuated mainly through three

98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 255.
100. LINDLEY, supra note 31, at 52.
101. Id. at 323.
102. William H. Cowles, The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 CENTRAL L.J. 343, 348 (1903).
103. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Joseph H. Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in
Partnership:The Struggle for a Definition, 8 MICH. L. REV. 609, 627, 629 (1917) (noting that, in
the eighteenth century, it became "firmly fixed in the minds of common law courts and lawyers ...
that a partnership holding was sui generis" and that the common law "established, apparently
unconsciously, a 'tenancy in partnership,' though it did not give it a name").
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specific doctrines. These were what I called above the "disgorgement
feature," the "in rem feature," and the "title consolidation" feature. We
now examine these in turn.
1. The Disgorgement Feature
I suggested above why expectation damages are likely to be
inadequate when a co-venturer diverts an individually owned
productive asset from the business. The harm from breach, in terms of
discounted cash flows, may be very hard to ascertain. (Business
valuation is difficult and specialized work; investment bankers are paid
large sums to do it.) Standard contract doctrine bars plaintiffs from
recovering speculative damages, such as lost future profits. Expectation
damages will therefore be undercompensatory, setting the stage for
inefficient breach.
Of course, the remaining co-venturers could make a counteroffer
to prevent defection. In a world with no transaction costs or bargaining
breakdowns, the asset will stay in the business so long as it generates
more value there than elsewhere. This would of course be true even if
the state didn't enforce contracts at all. 104 But the real world obviously
does have transaction costs and bargaining breakdowns. Even if it
didn't, the ability to credibly commit one's future self-to tie oneself to
the mast-is economically valuable in itself. 05 In a dynamic setting,
such strong commitments may be necessary in order to induce others to
invest in the first place. It follows that undercompensatory damages are
socially costly.
Disgorgement differs fundamentally from expectation damages.
In economic terms, disgorgement places the breaching party in the
position she would be in had the breach not occurred. By contrast,
expectation damages place the nonbreaching party in the position he
would be in absent breach. The ubiquitous (if not entirely realistic)
illustration of "efficient breach" shows the distinction. Party A agrees
to sell widgets to Party B for $100. The widgets are worth $110 to Party
B. Party A breaches the contact in order to sell the widgets to Party C
for $120. The measure of expectation damages is $10-the amount
needed to make Party B whole. Disgorgement would have yielded the

104. See Daniel A. Farber, Reassessingthe Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1478 (1980) ("All measures of damages are economically
equivalent in the absence of transaction costs.").
105. The ability to make such commitments overcomes what economists call a "time
inconsistency problem."
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plaintiff $20. This is a windfall, in the sense that plaintiff prefers breach
to performance.
That the law of contracts favors expectation damages, and
eschews the (higher) disgorgement measure, is almost beyond
dispute. 106 It is true that scholars have identified some isolated
instances in which disgorgement has been awarded for breach of
contract. 0 7 But these are extraordinary cases, and recent ones.
According to one leading expert, "[D]isgorgement remedies .

.

. have no

basis in standard contract doctrine," and "disgorgement for breach of
contract-meaning a recovery in excess of plaintiffs loss, intended to
strip the defendant of the profits of a wrong-is essentially unknown"
outside a narrow class of cases.10 8
By
contrast,
in partnership-as
in other fiduciary
relationships-the disgorgement remedy is standard. 0 9 "The remedy is
prophylactic in nature," notes the leading modern partnership treatise,
"based on the need not only to compensate but also to deter conduct that
poses a risk of damage to the partnership." 110 The same remedy was
available at common law. According to Parsons: "[N]o partner can make
any use of [partnership] property for his own particular benefit; but he
will be held chargeable for all the profits and advantages which may
accrue from such use, either as trustee, or in some other adequate
way."" 1 According to Story, any such partner "will be held accountable,
not only for the interest of the funds so withdrawn . .. but also for all
the profits which he has made thereby."11 2
The disgorgement remedy offers co-venturers a level of
commitment that expectation damages can't match. The defecting coventurer must hand over any past and future earnings arising from
defection. Note that there is no speculative aspect to this remedy-no
need for the court to estimate any future cash flows. Actual cash flows
106. For a provocative contrary view, see Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep
Your Promises:A Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181 (2011).
The authors include examples pertaining to fiduciary relations and constructive trusts, however,
which are typically characterized as not wholly "contractual."
107. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in ContractLaw, 105 MICH. L. REV.
559, 562 (2006); Farnsworth, supra note 63, at 1339 (noting that "[e]ven advocates of the
disgorgement principle [in contract disputes] concede that judicial recognition has been rare").
108. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "RestitutionInterest," and the Restatement of
Contracts, 79 TEx. L. REV. 2021, 2031 (2001). Kull notes that the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts has engendered confusion by using the term "restitution," but he shows beyond doubt
that this was not meant to authorize disgorgement.
109. See HURT ET AL., supra note 25, §§ 6.07(c), (i).
110. Id. § 6.07(i).
111. PARSONS, supra note 78, at 394.
112. STORY, supra note 85, at 371.
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are handed over. Note also that disgorgement removes the incentive to
defect in the first place. In effect, the disgorgement remedy gives the
venture's governance structure veto power over asset diversion. In
Calabresi-Melamed terms, the asset configuration is protected by a
property rule rather than a liability rule. To be sure, this type of strong
commitment comes at a cost. Owing to holdup problems, property rules
may sometimes obstruct efficient violations of the underlying
entitlement. 113 But this cost must be weighed against the corresponding
benefit. 1 14 In the context of joint enterprise-where expectation
damages are systematically undercompensatory-property rules
prevent co-venturers from defecting with their individually owned
assets, allowing for stickier asset configurations.
But isn't this just contract, inasmuch as it is a consensual
relationship, presumably reflecting the parties' ex ante preferences?
This is true only if we treat "contract" as an abstraction rather than as
a body of law with its own internal logic. As described above, contract
doctrine reflects deep liability-rule norms, and it resists parties' efforts
to opt out of those norms and into property-rule norms.1 15 Disgorgement
is quintessentially equitable and may require ongoing judicial
supervision and involvement. The court imposes a constructive trust on
the breaching party; the nonbreaching party owns any future earnings
that accrue to the breaching party as a result of breach. The
disgorgement remedy sounds in property rather than contract.
2. The In Rem Feature
Consider now the second doctrinal feature that nullified
individual partners' property interests at common law: what I referred
to above as the "in rem" feature. 116 When an individual partner, holding
legal title to a partnership asset, sold the asset without partnership
authorization, a knowing purchaser of the asset took it subject to the
"equities" of the partners. 117 That is to say, the purchaser was required
113. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1106-10.
114. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004)
(describing information-cost advantages of property rules over liability rules). Relatedly, another
scholar suggests that "[d]isgorgement awarding the plaintiff more than he lost is justified in a
narrow class of cases in which the defendant's election to breach imposes harms that a potential
liability for provable damages will not adequately deter." Kull, supra note 108, at 2052.
115. See supra Section II.B.
116. I use the term "in rem" to refer to situations in which "someone has a right that holds
against a large and indefinite class of others, as opposed to specifically identified others." Merrill
& Smith, supra note 49, at 782.
117. For a description of the common law partners' equities doctrine, see RIBSTEIN, supranote
16, at 42; HURT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3.05(c)(2). The in rem feature described here is analogous
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to use the asset for partnership purposes-if indeed the purchaser was
deemed to have title at all. The partners' right to have the asset
deployed for business purposes was thus enforceable against third
parties with whom no contractual privity existed: the right "ran with
the asset."11 8
The Parsons and Story treatises treat this topic in detail.
According to Parsons, knowing vendees of partnership assets sold
without authorization (i.e., in contravention of partnership governance)
are deemed "to be trustees thereof for the benefit of the firm"; indeed,
"[s]uch a sale would pass no title whatever."1 1 9 According to Story:
[W]here one partner misapplies the funds, or securities, or other effects of the partnership
in discharge or payment of his own private debts, claims, or contracts . . . the creditor,
dealing with the partner and knowing the circumstances, will be deemed to act mala fide
120
and in fraud of the partnership, and the transaction . .. will be treated as a nullity.

Both Parsons and Story were clear that the doctrine applied
even to real estate held in the name of the errant partner. "[H]e who
happens to have the legal title, cannot sell the real estate without the
consent and authority of the rest, so as to give title to a grantee having
notice," wrote Parsons. 121 "[H]e cannot directly convey or appropriate it,
excepting so far as he has the legal title in himself, and then a purchaser
with knowledge or the means of knowledge takes the land subject to all
the equities of the partners."1 22 Indeed, "if the grantee knew or had
sufficient means of knowing that it belonged to the firm, his title will be
annulled, or he will be charged as trustee for the firm." 123 He concluded
that "[sluch a sale would pass no title whatever." 124 Story said much the
same. "As in all cases of real estate held on trust," he wrote, "one who
to the familiar "tracing" remedy in the law of trusts. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 161 (6th
ed. 1987). In agency law, similar principles apply in the case of an agent's unauthorized transfer
of a principal's property. It merits emphasis that this does not imply that agency law could
substitute for partnership law in supplying the in rem feature. If the only available technologies
were property, contract, and agency, then each specific business asset would be associated with at
least one partner as "principal," and the remaining co-owners would be unable to assert tracingstyle remedies against the principal'stransferees.
118. In their scholarship on property and contract, Hansmann and Kraakman treat this
running-with-the-asset feature as noncontractual. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S374 (2002) ("Property rights differ from contract rights in that a property
right in an asset, unlike a contract right, can be enforced against subsequent transferees of other
rights in the asset. That is, a property right 'runs with the asset.' ").
119. PARSONS, supra note 78, at 164, 168.
120. STORY, supranote 85, at 222.
121. PARSONS, supra note 78, at 376-77.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 378.
124. Id. at 168.
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purchases real estate from the partner having the legal title, with notice
that it is partnership property, will take the land subject to the equities
of the partners and partnership creditors . . . ."125
Notably, this in rem feature applied equally to heirs and
devisees of a deceased partner, despite the absence of privity. "The heir
always takes the real estate in order to support the legal title, and is
then held as trustee for all those purposes to which the land must be
devoted in order to make it effectually partnership property," wrote
Parsons. 126 "If land be conveyed to partners, in fact as partnership
property, but in form to them as tenants in common, and one dies, his
heir becomes tenant in common with the other partners. Here, as
before, he holds as trustee for the partnership . . . ."127 According to
Story: "[A]s in other trusts, partnership equities will be enforced
against the heirs, devisees, or widow of the partner who held the legal
title." 128

If the disgorgement feature was foreign to contract, the in rem
feature was all the more so. 1 2 9 Hansmann and Kraakman argued that
asset partitioning is fundamentally noncontractual inasmuch as it
binds third parties: creditors of individual partners are subordinated by
operation of law to business creditors in the division of business assets.
The in rem feature described here has this same noncontractual
quality, but in furtherance of different ends: not the facilitation of credit
analysis, but rather the maintenance of going-concern value through
the cementing of partners' ex ante commitment. In effect, each partner
had the status of mere agent with respect to all partnership property.
Equivalently stated, no individual partner was a principal with respect
to any specific business asset, irrespective of legal title. The result was
a far more tightly bound asset configuration than could have been
achieved through contract. Like the disgorgement feature, the in rem
feature promoted business continuity.

125. STORY, supra note 85, at 135 (coauthor's addition).
126. PARSONS, supranote 78, at 373.
127. Id. at 374 (footnote omitted).
128. STORY, supra note 85, at 135 (coauthor's addition).
129. A number of scholars have identified this in rem quality as the distinguishing feature of
property entitlements. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, Optimal Property Rights in
Financial Contracting, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3401, 3402 (2011); Merrill & Smith, supra note 49;
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111
YALE L.J. 357, 358-59 (2001). The other leading contender is the Calabresi-Melamed property
rule/liability rule distinction. It is notable that, along both of these dimensions, traditional
partnership law embedded property-type features.
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3. The Title Consolidation Feature
At common law, partners' relinquishment of individual property
rights in specific assets was not limited to the life of the partnership. It
extended through dissolution. The waiver of property rights was
therefore permanent; prerogatives of ownership in specific business
assets did not revert to individual partners at termination.
To put the same point another way: upon dissolution, no partner
was entitled to have the firm's assets divvied up or to assert a property
right in any specific business asset. The nineteenth-century
partnership treatises are unanimous on this score. According to
Parsons, "a mere dissolution has no effect whatever on the property of
the partners." 130 Story noted that, upon dissolution, there is no
"division . .. in kind" of partnership property unless all the partners
agree to it.131 Gow observed that, upon dissolution, "[o]ne partner has
no claim upon his individual proportion of a specific article .

. .

. He

cannot separate his share from the bulk of the joint property."1 32
Lindley wrote that "[a] partner has no right to partition in specie, but
is entitled, on a dissolution, to have the partnership property, whether
land or not, sold, and the proceeds divided."1 33 And William Watson
likewise wrote that no partner can insist on an "actual division of
specific effects" upon dissolution.1 34
What each partner received upon dissolution was instead an
option to insist upon a sale of the entire business, under the supervision
of the court (or a court-appointed manager) if necessary. 13 5 The idea was
to maintain going-concern value by selling the business as a whole
rather than piecemeal. To preempt the auction, a deal could be-and
apparently often was-struck between those partners wishing to
continue the business, on the one hand, and those wishing to (or forced
to) depart, on the other.1 36 The result in such cases was a fixed cash
payment from the continuing to the departing partner(s), paid either
immediately or in installments over time. The partnership was

130.
131.
132.
133.

PARSONS, supra note 78, at 386.
STORY, supra note 85, at 544.
GOW, supra note 92, at 256-57.
LINDLEY, supra note 31, at 52.

134. WILLIAM WATSON, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 96 (London, J. Butterworth,

2d ed. 1807).
135. See GOW, supra note 92, at 257; PARSONS, supra note 78, at 446, 525; STORY, supra note
85, at 544; WATSON, supra note 134, at 386. Business continuity could also be enhanced by the
inclusion of continuation provisions in the partnership agreement, but the more important point
is that even the default rule was conducive to business continuity.
136. This remains true under modern American partnership law. See supra note 59.
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"dissolved" in such cases, but the business continued. As Parsons noted,
upon dissolution, partners would frequently "value the property, goodwill, &c., and found their arrangements upon this estimate, one paying
to the other a sum of money, without any account being taken." 137
According to Gow, "[o]n the secession of one partner from a firm, it is,
generally speaking, agreed, that he shall receive a sum of money or an
annuity, proportioned to his share in the concern . . . ."138 Watson
agreed: "In these cases the partner coming in or retiring generally pays
or receives a sum of money in proportion to his share in the concern."1 39
Title to business assets was thereby consolidated in the continuing
partnership, and departing partners could claim no property interest in
any specific asset.
To be sure, asset configurations were not always successfully
protected; dissolution could be hazardous to going-concern value.
Partnerships then (as today) were easily dissolvable. Absent agreement
to the contrary, traditional partnerships were dissolved at the will of
any partner, and dissolution was automatic upon the death or
bankruptcy of any partner. But it is not the case, as some modern
scholars have seemed to assume, 140 that business assets were liquidated
piecemeal whenever a partnership was dissolved at common law.
Dissolution referred to a change in legal relations; it did not necessarily
mean the end of the business. 141 By disallowing individual partners
from asserting property rights in specific business assets upon
dissolution, traditional partnership law increased the likelihood that
the asset configuration would remain intact.

&

137. PARSONS, supra note 78, at 511.
138. GOW, supra note 92, at 259.
139. WATSON, supra note 134, at 386.
140. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 20, at 409 (observing that in a traditional partnership at will
any partner could terminate the relationship, and thereby force dissolution of the assets of the
business, at any time and for any reason" (emphasis added)); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
1, at 434 (noting that, in the contemporary partnership at will, "the firm's owners are free to
withdraw their share of the firm's assets at any time" (emphasis added)); Naomi R. Lamoreaux
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the
United States Before the Great Depression,in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S

ECONOMIC HISTORY 125 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006) (developing a model in
which partnership dissolution automatically triggered piecemeal business liquidation and loss of
going-concern value).
141. As Alan Bromberg has emphasized, "dissolution itself is a technical concept of little
inherent interest," and "there may be a winding up of the affairs of a partnership without
liquidation of the business as a going concern if the business is continued by some of the partners,
in what is technically a new firm, with appropriate payments to settle the accounts of the old firm."
Alan R. Bromberg, PartnershipDissolution-Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV.
631, 631-32 (1965).
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Modern scholars have often overlooked the features of
traditional partnership law that were conducive to business continuity,
in part because they have tended to compare the traditional
partnership to the corporation. Indisputably, partnerships were more
fragile than corporations. Corporations achieved full capital lock-in and
were therefore better suited to large-scale, capital-intensive
enterprise. 1 42 The question at hand, though, is what partnership
accomplished that contract alone could not. And it is highly unlikely
that the forced-sale option-the linchpin by which both legal title and
collective beneficial ownership were consolidated in the continuing
partners upon dissolution-could have been effectuated by contract.
This type of muscular, equitable judicial intervention could not have
been called forth through purely contractual means. 1 43
The point comes through quite clearly when we consider the
effects of a partner's death or bankruptcy. No mere contract between
co-venturers could bind the heirs/devisees (in the case of death) or
estate administrators/creditors (in the case of bankruptcy) of any coventurer to submit to a forced sale of assets. But in partnership law
they were so bound: the in rem and forced-sale features were
interlocked. As to death, according to Parsons, "the representatives of
the deceased cannot claim or take any one chattel, or any portion of the
merchandise."1 4 4 The representatives stood on the same footing as a
partner: according to Story, "they are entitled to have the property sold"
in its entirety.1 45 The situation in bankruptcy was analogous. According
to Parsons, when a partner went bankrupt, the "court would always
decree a sale where the assignees requested it for good cause."1 4 6 But
typically this didn't happen: "Usually, there is no sale, but the solvent
partners settle up the concern so far as to ascertain the value of the
bankrupt's interest, and this they pay to the assignees."1 47 This result
clearly could not have been effectuated by a mere contract among
business co-owners; such a contract could not have bound third parties
who succeeded to the property in question.
Remarkably, the same analysis applied in the case of execution
by partners' individual creditors. Such creditors were entitled to
exercise the forced-sale option, but generally speaking they were not
entitled to dismantle the business through direct recourse to specific
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Blair, supra note 20.
See PARSONS, supra note 78, at 15.
Id. at 441.
STORY, supra note 85, at 537.
PARSONS, supra note 78, at 507.
Id. at 506. Lindley offered a similar analysis. See LINDLEY, supranote 31, at 339.
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assets.1 48 "[I]t has long since been the well established rule and practice,
that no private creditor of a partner could take by his execution
anything more than that partner's share in whatever surplus remained
after the partnership effects had paid the partnership debts," wrote
Parsons.1 49 He continued:
[A] creditor of any debtor can secure to himself, and for his own benefit by attachment
and levy, only the property, interest, or right which his debtor has ... What, then, is the
right, or interest, or property of a partner to or in the effects of the partnership? Certainly
not a separate and exclusive right to any part or portion of it; or any right of any kind to
any one part rather than to any other part; or any other right or interest than that which
all the other partners have. . . . What the law permits him to do or cause to be done,
without the consent of others, is to settle the concern, pay the debts, and then divide the
surplus. This is, practically speaking, the whole of his right. And this, and only this, is
therefore the right which his private creditor can acquire by attachment or execution.
That is, his creditor may put himself exactly in the place of his debtor, both as to the
power of the latter and as to its limitations. . . .The partner himself is wholly without the
right (unless by agreement) of appropriating to himself in severalty anything whatever
which belongs to the common stock. . . . How, then, can it be held . . . that his private

creditor [may do so]?150

Similarly, Story noted the following regarding the sale of partnership
property upon execution by separate creditors:
[Tihe sheriff may seize, and should seize, the interest of the separate partner in the
property of the partnership; and that, and that alone, he is at liberty to sell upon the
execution.... Strictly, indeed, and properly speaking, the sale does not, at least in the
view of a court of equity, transfer any part of the joint property to the purchaser, so as to
entitle him exclusively to take it or withhold it from the other partners; for that would be
to place him in a better situation than the execution partner himself in relation to the
property. But it gives him a right to a bill in equity, calling for an account and settlement
of the partnership concerns, and thus to entitle himself to that interest in the property,
which, upon the final adjustment and settlement of the partnership concerns, shall be
15 1
ascertained to belong to the execution partner, and nothing more.

Watson's analysis was the same: Where there was execution against
one partner,
148. To be sure, there was some contrary authority on this score, and confusion at common
law over the process by which a separate creditor enforced process against a partner-debtor's
interest in partnership property was a major impetus behind the (statutory) creation of the
"charging order" in both England and the United States. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 28, 6 U.L.A. 244
(2015); English Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, § 23. J. Gordon Gose has noted that,
while the old common law procedure was "artificial and confusing" and could be hazardous to
going-concern value, the effect was "a procedure commencing with the seizure of property but in
its later stages converted into aproceeding whereby the debtor's beneficialinterest is made available
to his creditor." J. Gordon Gose, The ChargingOrder Under the Uniform PartnershipAct, 28 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1953) (emphasis added); see also Note, The Power of a Partner'sIndividual Creditor
to Reach PartnershipProperty, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 438-39 (1927) (describing conflicting
authority).
149. PARSONS, supra note 78, at 343.
150. Id. at 350-53 (emphasis omitted).
151. STORY, supra note 85, at 405-08.
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[t]he best opinion seems to be, that the sheriff ... should sell only an undivided moiety of
the partnership effects. Conveniency and justice certainly require this mode of proceeding,
as it enables the other partner to buy in the share sold, so that the business is not broke
up or disturbed; and the vendee, if a stranger, will only succeed to the share due to the
defendant upon a balance being struck. . . . Courts of equity consider that the interest of
each partner in the partnership effects is only what remains after the partnership
accounts are taken; and as the creditor cannot be entitled to any more than what his
debtor possessed, an account must be taken before the fruits of an execution upon the
1 52
partnership effects can be reaped.

Lindley agreed that it was only "the share of a partner"-that is, "his
proportion of the partnership assets after they have been all realised
and converted into money, and all the debts and liabilities have been
paid and discharged"-that "the sheriff can dispose of under a [writ of
execution] issued at the suit of a separate creditor." 153 It is clear from
these passages that partnership law was instrumental not only in
subordinatingseparate creditors' claims on business assets (the essence
of the asset-partitioning theory), but also in preventing separate
creditors from destroying going-concern value by asserting direct
property interests in specific business assets. Such a result clearly could
not have been achieved by a contract among business co-owners, as such
a contract would not have bound creditors.
Modern scholars often portray the traditional partnership as a
fragile, impermanent relationship. 1 54 Yet the old treatises contain
numerous references to long-standing partnerships. "We have in this
country many ancient firms, in which there may not be one person who
was a partner from the beginning," noted Parsons.15 5 "In England there
are firms which have survived some generations, but the name has
never been changed, and the business has gone on without deviation or
interruption. But we still say that the partnership is dissolved by every
change." 156 He went on to note that, after dissolution, "[firequently, the
new firm goes on in its regular business," and its customers "say
nothing, but continue their dealings with the new firm."1 5 7 According to
152. WATSON, supra note 134, at 100.
153. LINDLEY, supra note 31, at 339-40.
154. There have been exceptions; according to one leading expert, while "the partnership is,
on the surface, a fragile and temporary relationship . .. the common view of the partnership as an
easily terminable relationship is overly simplistic." Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of
Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1982); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Why Corporations?,1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 183, 193 (2004) (noting that "the continuity inherent in
the partnership form has long been recognized"). Blair describes some major instances of large
enterprises that functioned as partnerships over long periods in the nineteenth century. See Blair,
supra note 20, at 449-54.
155. PARSONS, supra note 78, at 407.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 425.
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Watson, "When a partnership is dissolved, it frequently happens that it
is only to make some alteration in the firm, and the partnership
business goes on as before."1 58 Lindley wrote: "Where a change occurs
in a firm by the retirement of one or more of its members, nothing is
more common than for the partners to agree that those who continue
the business shall take the property of the old firm and pay its
debts . . . ."159 In such cases, title was consolidated and the asset
configuration remained undisturbed. Business assets plainly weren't
scattered to the wind.

To sum up, at common law, individual partners lacked any
meaningful "property" interest in specific business assets. The three
equitable doctrines described above-the disgorgement feature, the in
rem feature, and the title-consolidation feature-nullified their legally
cognizable ownership interests. And this legal engineering allowed for
a much stronger form of commitment-a much tighter form of capital
"lock-in"-than would have been possible through contract, property,
and agency law. Notably, these doctrines were not designed to solve
information problems, A la Hansmann and Kraakman. Instead, they
were about overcoming excesses of property-the challenges of
fragmented property rights.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS
This Part explores parallels between the propertyrelinquishment theory of organizational law and three other scholarly
domains: the "anticommons" literature in property law, the dominant
account of the conceptual underpinnings of business bankruptcy law,
and the economic theory of the firm. It turns out that these disparate
fields share a common deep structure, inasmuch as they are centrally
concerned with the problems that arise from fragmentary property
interests.
A. OrganizationalLaw and the Anticommons
Among the more provocative and influential ideas in property
law scholarship over the past several decades has been Michael Heller's

158. WATSON, supra note 134, at 386.
159. LINDLEY, supranote 31, at 336.
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"tragedy of the anticommons." 160 Heller turns the tables on the familiar
"tragedy of the commons," a metaphor for a type of collective action
problem. 161 In the tragedy of the commons, too much access to a shared
resource leads to overuse and depletion. To use the standard example,
if every sheep herder has unlimited access to a given pasture, their
sheep will overgraze the pasture in an unsustainable way. Each
individual herder receives a direct benefit from adding to his flock,
while the resulting costs of resource degradation are shared with
others. The resource is wasted, leaving everyone worse off in the
aggregate. Thus the rational but uncoordinated actions of individuals
produce a bad result. A sole owner, by contrast, would use the resource
in a measured and sustainable way, thereby maximizing the value of
the resource. One interpretation of the tragedy of the commons is that
insufficient property rights can lead to economic waste.
Heller's insight was to identify-and attach a name toessentially the opposite problem, which is that excessive property rights
can lead to economic waste. The term anticommons, he writes, "covers
any setting in which too many people can block each other from creating
or using a scarce resource." 162 In these settings, the inefficiency arises
not from overuse but from underuse of the resource. "When too many
people own pieces of one thing," writes Heller, "cooperation breaks
down, wealth disappears, and everybody loses."1 6 3 Each owner has the
right to exclude, resulting in gridlock. An important implication of
Heller's thesis is that avoiding economic waste requires more than
clarity of property rights. In a world of positive transaction costs, the
way such rights are bundled matters too.
To illustrate his thesis, Heller describes the control over the
Rhine River in the Middle Ages. 164 The Rhine was an important trade
route, and the Holy Roman Empire protected it, charging merchants
modest tolls to use the river. When the Holy Roman Empire declined,
however, hundreds of German barons established castles up and down
the Rhine, charging tolls for the use of each segment. The result was
gridlock: while the resource itself had not changed, its use plummeted,
and everybody (even the barons) suffered as a result. Thus excessively
160. See MICHAELA. HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008) [hereinafter HELLER, GRIDLOCK

ECONOMY]; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
161. The term was coined by Garrett Hardin. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) ("Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.").
162. HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note 160, at 18.

163. Id. at xiv.
164. See id. at 3-4.
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subdivided "property" rights destroyed wealth. Heller applies this
insight to various modern contexts: fragmentary rights to U.S. airwaves
that render most of the broadcast spectrum pointlessly idle,165
expansive patent protection that impedes the creation of valuable
pharmaceuticals, 166 and even the mismanagement of privatization in
the former Soviet Union.167
The property-relinquishment theory of organizational law
presented herein has much in common with Heller's anticommons
concept. At the core of both theories is the problem of fragmentary
ownership leading to economic waste. When it comes to joint enterprise,
fragmentary ownership generates waste in two ways. First, asset
diversion may destroy going-concern value. Second, and more
important, in a dynamic setting, the very prospect of such diversion
discourages the formation of joint enterprise in the first place. To
prevent these forms of waste, business co-owners must be divested of
property rights in specific business assets-a result that cannot be
achieved through contracting alone. Organizational law thus overcomes
a form of anticommons that would otherwise frustrate the creation of
productive enterprise.
Intriguingly, Heller notes that property law contains a set of
doctrines that impede excessive fragmentation. "Hidden within the
law," he writes, "is a boundary principle that limits the right to
subdivide private property into wasteful fragments." 168 This boundary
principle finds expression in, among other things, zoning rules that
limit subdivision; 169 the numerus clausus principle, which proscribes
the creation of new property estates; 170 and the rule against
perpetuities, which reduces "inter-temporal" fragmentation.1 71 Heller
argues that it is important to embed such limits in the law itself,
because fragmentation "may operate as a one-way ratchet"-it is easier
to fragment than to reassemble. 172

165. See id. at 79-106.
166. See id. at 49-78.
167. See id. at 145-48.
168. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1165
(1999).
169. See id. at 1173.
170. See id. at 1176.
171. See id. at 1179.
172. Id. at 1165. Where property has already been fragmented, Heller suggests novel methods
of assembly. For example, as an alternative to using eminent domain for economic development,
he and a coauthor propose the creation of "land assembly districts" under which landowners would
collectively decide through a self-governance arrangement whether to proceed with assembly. See
Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1465 (2008).
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One way of understanding organizational law-including, but
not limited to, the traditional partnership-is precisely as a propertyassembly mechanism. By forfeiting property interests to the governance
structure of the organization, co-owners reduce the likelihood of valuedestroying defection; they thereby mutually encourage each other to
join the enterprise in the first place. Note that, like Heller's
anticommons concept, the property-relinquishment theory is mostly
about commitment and cooperation; it has little to do with reducing
monitoring costs or other information costs.
B. OrganizationalLaw and the Logic of Bankruptcy Law
The property-relinquishment theory of organizational law finds
a nice analogue in the theoretical foundations of business bankruptcy
law. Among business law scholars, it is widely accepted that business
bankruptcy law functions primarily as a collective debt-collection
device. 173 Without bankruptcy law, creditors' remedies against
nonperforming debtors would be governed by ordinary debtor-creditor
law. A key feature of ordinary debtor-creditor law-what Thomas
Jackson has called "grab law"-is the characteristic of first-come, firstserved. 174 A creditor seeking repayment from a nonpaying debtor asks
the court for relief; when judgment is entered, the creditor may enlist
the sheriff to seize property from the debtor in satisfaction of the claim.
When there aren't enough assets to satisfy all creditors, those who get
in line first get paid off, while those who don't lose out.
In the context of business insolvency, first-come, first-served
creditor remedies may destroy value. "The use of individual creditor
remedies may lead to a piecemeal dismantling of a debtor's business by
the untimely removal of necessary operating assets," writes Jackson. 175
"[A] collection of assets is sometimes more valuable together than the
same assets would be if spread to the winds. It is often referred to as
the surplus of a going-concern value over a liquidation value."1 76 Grab

law, then, raises the prospect of inefficiently dismantling asset
configurations. The issue can be understood as a collective action
problem; indeed, Jackson analogizes grab law to the tragedy of the
commons. "The question at the core of bankruptcy law," writes Jackson,

173. For an influential articulation of this view, see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).

174. Id. at 8-9.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id.
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"is whether a better ordering system can be devised that would be worth
the inevitable costs associated with implementing a new system."17 7
Bankruptcy law supplants grab law-which is characterized by
first-come, first-served-in favor of a collective and compulsory
proceeding. Crucial to this proceeding is an automatic stay on creditor
claims.1 78 The automatic stay, effective upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition, forecloses piecemeal dismantling. The business may then be
chopped up sensibly in liquidation, or it may remain intact while the
firm's capital structure is adjusted in a reorganization. Necessarily,
bankruptcy law usurps individual creditor remedies. But it should
nevertheless make creditors as a whole better off, primarily because it
protects asset configurations. In the words of two other prominent
bankruptcy scholars, "The details of the current bankruptcy system are
labyrinthine, but they can be described generally as constraining the
collection rights of each creditor individually in order to promote a
somewhat more efficient liquidation or reorganization for the benefit of
all concerned." 179
It should be clear that organizational law and business
bankruptcy law enjoy a deep conceptual symmetry. The propertyrelinquishment feature of organizational law prevents business coowners from inefficiently dismantling asset configurations through
rational, self-interested behavior-a problem that cannot be solved
through contracting. Bankruptcy law prevents business creditorsfrom
doing the same. To put the point slightly differently, organizational law
causes business co-owners to relinquish property rights in specific
business assets, while bankruptcy law prevents business creditors from
establishing or exercising such property rights.
Coincidentally, around the time Hansmann and Kraakman were
asking what organizational law adds to contract, bankruptcy law
scholarship was preoccupied with the question whether business
bankruptcy law might be replaced by "contractualist" approaches. 18 0 In

177. Id. at 10.
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
179. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2005).
180. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to CorporateBankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory
Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998). Warren and Westbrook wrote in
2005 that the "contractualist" approach-or "privatization of bankruptcy"-had "dominated the
academic stage" of bankruptcy scholarship "[flor nearly a decade." Warren & Westbrook, supra
note 179, at 1198.
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other words, the question was what bankruptcy law adds to contract.
This scholarly parallelism arguably reflects a deeper, functional one.
Both organizational law and bankruptcy law are concerned, in large
measure, with preventing the inefficient disassembly of asset
configurations. The very existence of these bodies of law testifies to the
insufficiency of contract in maintaining going-concern value.
Finally, the issue of administrative costs-the costs of
abandoning judicial minimalism-arises here too. In his analysis of the
historical evolution of debtor-creditor law, Robert Clark has noted that
the gradual shift from grab law to equity receivership to full-fledged
bankruptcy reorganization
law brought with it significant
administrative costs.
[O]nly with the rise of very large business enterprises were there sufficiently frequent
and sizable economies of scale in debt-enforcement proceedings to justify the legal
innovations in question. Unless the surplus of going-concern value over liquidation value
was substantial, as it might be for a large business, or the debtor business was so large
and complex that it would have been impossible or quite expensive to find or to create a
fair-sized pool of reasonably informed potential outside buyers, the efficiency benefits of
a receivership or reorganization proceeding would not exceed the very substantial
81
administrative, negotiation, and legal costs of the proceeding itself. 1

Just as organizational law is, administratively speaking, more
resource-intensive than contract law, bankruptcy law is more resourceintensive than grab law. In both cases, the added administrative cost is
justified by the immense value that accrues to society from the creation
and maintenance of going-concern value in productive enterprise.
C. OrganizationalLaw and the Economic Theory of the Firm
The economic theory of the firm seeks to explain the nature and
boundaries of business firms. 182 Given that organizational forms are the
legal vehicle for most productive enterprise, it is only natural that one
would find connections between the economic theory of the firm and
organizational law theory.18 3
To see these connections, it is useful to briefly review some
landmark contributions to the economic theory of the firm. In a
pioneering article, Ronald Coase envisioned firms as miniature

181. Robert C. Clark, The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1254
(1981).
182. For a good and mostly nontechnical (though somewhat dated) overview, see Bengt R.
Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
61 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
183. For a previous exploration of these connections, see Edward M. Iacobucci & George G.
Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007).
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command-and-control economies residing within a more general
context of market exchange. 184 He presented firms' existence as a
puzzle. "[1In view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination
will be done by the price mechanism," he asked, "why is such
organisation necessary? Why are there these 'islands of conscious
power'?" 185 His answer was, essentially, transaction costs.

186

If there

were no transactions costs, every economic interaction would be
governed by "market" terms; for example, rather than instructing an
employee to perform some task, a businessperson would put the task up
for bid to the market and accept the bidder who was willing to perform
the task at lowest cost. The existence of transaction costs, Coase argued,
makes this impracticable. It may therefore be more efficient to have
dedicated employment structures. "[T]he distinguishing mark of the
firm," he wrote, "is the supersession of the price mechanism."1 8 7 Coase
thus pictured the firm as a kind of long-term contract in which "the
service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact
details being left until a later date."18 8 According to Coase: "When the
direction of resources (within the limit of the contract) becomes
dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a
'firm' may be obtained."18 9 Intriguingly, Coase's theory also offered a
way of thinking about the size of firms in marginal cost terms. "A firm
will tend to expand," he wrote, "until the costs of organizing an extra
transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out
the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or
the costs of organizing in another firm." 9 o
Building on Coase's foundation, Oliver Williamson has
articulated a theory of the firm relying on three basic postulates. First,
contracts are incomplete: it isn't feasible to write a contract that covers
every possible eventuality. 19 1 Second, people are opportunistic: they will
behave strategically to further their own interests. 192 Third, many
business inputs are characterized by "asset specificity": 1 9 3 value is lost
when such assets are redeployed to other uses. In combination,
184. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 16 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
185. Id. at 388.
186. See id. at 390-91.
187. Id. at 389.
188. Id. at 392.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 395.
191. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 182, at 135, 139-40.
192. See id. at 139.
193. See id. at 142-43.
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Williamson argues, these three aspects of the commercial world pose
obstacles to efficient resource allocation. The reason is that holdup
problems become endemic. When one party realizes that an asset owner
must transact with that party or else suffer a loss-the condition of
asset specificity-the party will raise the price opportunistically. The
prospect of such opportunism discourages valuable asset-specific
investment in the first place. Contracting provides only an imperfect
solution, given contractual incompleteness. To overcome these
obstacles, notes Williamson, parties may choose to implement
''governance structures" such as "recourse to collective decision making
under some form of combined ownership." 194
Expanding on this analysis, Oliver Hart has advanced what he
calls a "property rights" theory of the firm. 195 Like Williamson, Hart
stresses the importance of contractual incompleteness, opportunism,
and asset specificity. 196 But Hart's theory emphasizes the power that
accompanies property rights. "[F]irms arise in situations where people
cannot write good contracts and where the allocation of power or control
is therefore important," he writes. 19 7 And "ownership is a source of
power when contracts are incomplete." 198 In his model, owners possess
residual control rights in assets, which confers power. Owing to
contractual incompleteness, contracts alone are insufficient to align
incentives and create efficient resource allocations. In these
circumstances, he argues, combined ownership of business assets
within the firm may be more efficient than contracting under separate

194. Id. at 147.
195. OLIVER HART, FIRMs, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); see also Sanford J.

Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales articulate
a theory of the firm built around the problem of expropriation. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy:A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, 116
Q.J. EcoN. 805 (2001). In creating an enterprise, an entrepreneur brings some "unique critical
resource"-an idea, business process, set of customer relationships, or something of this nature.
Id. at 805. The problem she faces is how to enlist cooperation from other people for production. By
bringing others into the fold, the entrepreneur runs the risk that they might expropriate some or
all of the critical resource. "[Tlhe degree of expropriability of the technology," write Rajan and
Zingales, "is a measure of the difficulty of enforcing property rights." Id. at 808. Note that the
problem they describe is essentially the reverse of the problem analyzed in this Article: they focus
on the value of retaining, rather than relinquishing, property rights.
196. HART, supra note 195, at 26-27. Strictly speaking, Hart's theory doesn't require
opportunism; "rather than being opportunistic, [the parties may] simply have different views about
the returns from various asset usages and hence disagree about how the assets should be
employed." Id. at 88.
197. Id. at 1.
198. Id. at 29.
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ownership. 199 Hart's theory relies crucially on the existence of business
assets that are legally protectable as property. "Nonhuman assets are
an essential feature of a theory of the firm," he writes. 200 "A firm's
nonhuman assets . . . represent the glue that keeps the firm together,
whatever this may be."201
The property-relinquishment theory of organizational law
advanced herein enjoys a nice synergy with the theories of the firm just
described. Both Williamson and Hart build their theories of the firm on
assumptions
regarding
asset
specificity,
opportunism,
and
noncontractibility.
The
property-relinquishment
theory
of
organizational law rests on similar assumptions. The existence of
valuable asset configurations (going-concern value) implies that asset
redeployment is costly-the condition of asset specificity. The danger
that business co-owners (or their successors/heirs) will defect with
specific business assets is a manifestation of opportunism. And the
property-relinquishment theory presupposes contractual insufficiency,
though it is insufficiency of a particular kind: not contractual
"incompleteness" per se, but rather limitations stemming from remedial
minimalism and from the in personam nature of contractual
obligations.
Among the leading previous efforts to integrate economic and
legal theories of the firm is Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's "team
production" theory of corporate law. 2 0 2 Blair and Stout conceive of the
corporation as a tool to manage problems of team production, or
production in which it is impossible to determine the marginal
productivity of separate inputs solely by observing total output. 2 03 In
team-production contexts, team members have incentives to shirk if
surplus-sharing rules are determined ex ante; however, ex post
determinations invite rent-seeking as individuals compete to divvy a
fixed amount of wealth. In the Blair-Stout theory, team members
voluntarily "give up important rights," including "property rights" over
business inputs, to a governance structure or "mediating hierarchy"
(the board of directors) in order to overcome problems of shirking and
rent-seeking, thereby encouraging firm-specific investment by team
199. See id. at 33 ("[T]he benefit of integration is that the acquiring firm's incentive to make
relationship-specific investments increases since, given that it has more residual control rights, it
will receive a greater fraction of the ex post surplus created by such investment.").
200. Id. at 56.
201. Id. at 57.
202. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).

203. This conception of team production originated with Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM. EcON. REV. 777 (1972).
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members. 204 Importantly, though, the Blair-Stout theory is explicitly
one of the public corporation and not of organizational law more
generally; they explicitly exclude partnership from their analysis. 205 By
contrast, the analysis of this Article suggests that "giving up important
rights"-property rights in particular-is essential to other forms of
enterprise organization as well.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that asset partitioning-"the partitioning
off of a separate set of assets in which creditors of the firm itself have a
prior security interest,"206 in the words of Hansmann and Kraakman-

is a pervasive and important feature of organizational law. And there
can be little doubt that asset partitioning allows business creditors to
economize on information-though there may be reasons to question
the magnitude of those efficiencies. 20 7 Undeniably, the assetpartitioning theory constitutes a major, pioneering advance in our
understanding of the role that organizational law plays in commercial
affairs.
But is asset partitioning really the essential role of
organizational law, as is widely accepted among business law scholars
today? This Article has suggested that there is room for doubt on this
score. For organizational law performs another function that may be
every bit as important as asset partitioning: property relinquishment.
Unlike the asset-partitioning function, which concerns relations with
third parties, the property-relinquishment function is mostly about
relations among business co-owners themselves. It is about
commitment problems rather than information problems. As we have
seen, property relinquishment was present even in traditional AngloAmerican partnership law, despite superficial appearances to the
contrary. Or, to put the point slightly differently, the traditional

204. Blair & Stout, supra note 202, at 250. In pointing to the interplay between team
production problems and firm-specific investment, see id. at 271-72, Blair and Stout draw on
previous work by economists Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON 387 (1998). In the Rajan-Zingales model,
team members voluntarily give power to a "completely unrelated third party" as a strategy to limit
shirking and rent-seeking: "[T]he third party holds power so that the agents critical to production
do not use the power of ownership against each other." Id. at 422.
205. See Blair & Stout, supra note 202, at 281, 319.
206. Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 1, at 393.
207. See supra Part I.

1352

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1303

partnership provided more capital "lock-in"-to use Margaret Blair's
term 208-than has heretofore been recognized.
As I noted at the outset, the asset-partitioning and propertyrelinquishment theories are not mutually exclusive. In fact they are
quite complementary. Understanding the property-relinquishment
function of organizational law opens the way for deeper theoretical
integration between organizational law theory and other private law
topics-including property, contract, and debtor-creditor law-as well
as with the economic theory of the firm. It seems that organizational
law has more than one essential role.

208. Blair, supra note 20, at 388.

